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Abstract 
Richard Rorty argues that the subject-object picture of knowledge has been more 
trouble than it is worth and the realism, built upon it, should now be viewed as a defunct 
position. Donald Davidson's antirepresentationalism, Richard Rorty argues, reveals the 
unintelligibility of the realist position; realism depends upon the implausible notion of 
truth as sentences corresponding to (picturing or representing) the facts. Given 
antirepresentationalism, Rorty argues, we have to accept the idea that nothing makes a 
sentence true and drop the ambitions and intuitions inspired by the traditional but 
problematic dualism. Alternatively, Rorty suggests that we embrace the natural outcome 
of antirepresentationalism, that is, a new and bold pragmatic antirealism; antirealism 
denies both the objectivity of truth and the independence of the world. 
In this thesis, I challenge Rorty's claim that Davidson's antirepresentationalism 
necessarily leads to antirealism. The dismissal of representation heralds the end of a 
variety of plaguing epistemological problems; yet what remains unclear is whether this 
abandonment should also bring a loss of objectivity and invite a rejection of an 
independent world. As we shall see, Rorty's antirealism is not our only option post-
correspondence because Davidson provides us with a viable realist alternative; 
furthermore, our analysis will reveal Rorty's position to be internally incoherent. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that realism can survive, with considerable 
adjustment, the shift to the new causal/semantic picture of language. Davidson's 
philosophy of language spells out how we can remain committed to the realist's ambition 
of objectivity and its intuition of a world out there. Language is not a mirror or lens but it 
is through having a language that we see the world. 
11 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to acknowledge the instruction and supervision of Dr. Peter Trnka 
who acted as my thesis supervisor. Dr. Trnka offered much needed direction, advice and 
support. I would also like to thank Dr. David Thompson and Dr. James Bradley, two 
philosophers who always offered their insight, enthusiasm and friendship when I needed 
clarification, motivation or moorings. Additionally, Dr. Bradley motivated me to contact 
both Mr. Chris Bowers and Dr. Don Ross, the result being a six-month internship at the 
University of Cape Town, South Africa. 
I would like to thank the School of Graduate Studies for the graduate fellowships 
I received during 1998- 1999 and 1999-2000 terms. I also need to thank the 
Department of Philosophy and the Office of the Dean of Arts for securing my teaching 
assistantships during the period of my graduate study. 
Finally, I would like to thank my mother, Joan Angel, for always being there. 
iii 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................... .ii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................. .iii 
Table of Contents ................................................................................... .iv 
Introduction ............................................................................................ 1 
1.0 -- Correspondence, Realism and Antirepresentationalism: Rorty's Antirealism 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................... 6 
1.2 Wittgenstein's Pictures and Games ......................................................... 9 
1.3 Tarski's Truth Theory ...................................................................... 15 
1.4 Quine's Schemes ............................................................................. 17 
1.5 Antirepresentationalism ..................................................................... 29 
1. 6 Antirealism .................................................................................. 3 1 
2.0 -- Disquotation, Interpretation and Truth: Establishing Modest Realism 
2.1 Nullified Truth ............................................................................. 37 
2.2 Disquotation, Meaning and Semantic Truth ............................................ 44 
2.3 Radical Interpretation, Charity and Veridical Belief ................................. 57 
2.4 Externalism, Triangulation and Thought ............................................... 68 
2.5 Seeing Through Having A Language .................................................... 73 
2.6 Modest Realism ........................................................................... 76 
2. 7 Conclusion .................................................................................. 77 
3.0 --Politics, Pain and Irony: Difficulties within Antirealism 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................. 79 
3.2 Liberal Politics, Pain and 'We' ............................................................ 79 
3.3 Commonsense and Irony .................................................................. 86 
3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................. 89 
Bibliography of Works Cited ...................................................................... 93 
lV 
Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to challenge Richard Rorty's antirealism and determine 
whether the realist position can survive the downfall of the representational model of 
language. Philosophy is both troubled and obsessed with the epistemological gap 
presented by the subject-object picture of knowledge. Traditionally, idealists sought a 
solution to this dichotomy through ontological homogeneity whereas metaphysical 
realists turned to correspondence truth theory. Both programs have now come to be seen 
by many as failures. 
What we are to make of realism after the fall of the subject-object picture is 
unclear. Can an objective relationship between language and reality be rearticulated? Or, 
does the rejection of the subject-object architecture destroy the possibility of objectivity 
and eschew discussion of realism? Richard Rorty opts for the latter and argues that our 
only option post Donald Davidson's antirepresentationalism is antirealism. Rorty 
endorses a radical tum inward, a move away from objectivity and a rejection of 
externalism. Do we have to follow him into antirealism? I urge that we do not. 
Chapter 1 introduces the subject-object picture and clarifies the realist and 
antirealist positions. I present Ludwig Wittgenstein's (early position) and W. V. 0. 
Quine's positions as prime examples of the representational models of language that are 
giving us such trouble. I also introduce Alfred Tarski's work on constructing truth 
theories for formal languages. Explicating the views of truth ofthese three philosophers 
places our analysis in the context of some of the central debates in analytic philosophy 
and explicates the issues that motivate antirepresentationalism. I explain Davidson's 
antirepresentationalism as a critique of the realist idea of sentences confronting the facts. 
Davidson's antirepresentationalism, according to Rorty, suggests a radical way out of the 
subject-object picture; and, Rorty draws a strong antirealist conclusion- the denial of 
objective truth and the rejection of an independent world. According to Rorty, antirealism 
is the only option post-correspondence. 
I argue that we do not need to go that far. Rorty's antirealist conclusion can be 
denied on two counts: it is not our only option post correspondence and I will uncover 
serious tensions in Rorty's position that reveal it to be an unviable option. As I see it, if 
we can provide an account of the objectivity of true belief post-correspondence we will 
get realism more or less for free. Davidson's philosophy of language, I argue, allows us to 
do just that. 
In Chapter 2 I examine Rorty's rejection of objective truth and develop Davidson's 
reaffirmation of objectivity. According to Rorty, the loss of confrontation between 
language and world means that we have to take the ubiquity of language seriously and 
adopt a solely negative approach to truth. Rorty introduces three nullifying substitutes for 
truth, i.e., the commendatory, cautionary and disquotational truth theories; these avoid 
defining truth, avoid giving substantial accounts, and embrace a negative position. 
Justification looks better than truth and Rorty opts for solidarity over objectivity -
establishing an ethnocentric limit on truth. Davidson denies that the content of the 
concept of truth can be contained within disquotationallimits. 
Davidson recognizes the ubiquity of language, avoids metaphysical 
correspondence and examines truth 'at home', that is, from within his own language. 
Given Tarski's work, the construction of a truth theory for a particular language reveals 
that while true-in-Lis not totally trivial, reference and correspondence remain internal to 
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a particular language's employment of the concept of satisfaction. Hence, disquotation's 
normative limit appears secure; though Davidson claims to be filling-in the content of the 
concept of truth and admits he is defending a much larger account of truth than Rorty 
permits. 
From within the requirements of interpretation and communication Davidson 
shares the insight that communication requires the concept of charity. Charity brings out 
the essential semantic relations between meaning, belief and truth which demonstrate 
that beliefs are veridical (speakers cannot be mostly wrong about what there is)- that is, 
all language users employ a transcendental truth in communication. Davidson's defense 
of the massive truthfulness ofbeliefis supported by a required externalism (inherent in 
his rejection of scheme-content dualism and his theory of communication); together, they 
endorse a semantic realism. Davidson shows that truth escapes Rorty's ethnocentric limit 
and is, in fact, something much more central. 
Triangulation is the source of all objectivity between speaker, community and 
world. Triangulation sets out the conditions necessary for the emergence of error, which 
is the condition of learning and understanding the truthfulness of a sentence and, as such, 
makes objective truth, language and thought possible. Davidson's philosophy oflanguage 
reveals that truth is our most basic concept - it is a condition of speech - but is one that 
remains unproblematically undefined. As a condition, truth allows language to be an 
organ of propositional perception. Language is neither a veil nor a lens but it is by virtue 
of having a language that we know the world; we see the world through having a 
language. 
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Davidson gives us a vivid reformulation of the realist position; his semantic 
realism overcomes the antirealism objections, reaffirms the objectivity of truth, and 
returns us to the world (establishes an externalism). We can drop the subject-object 
picture and remain realists because we compromise and amend the traditional position. 
Keeping the objectivity of truth (including its explanatory value and central status) and 
denying antirealism means remaining modest about truth and how our language connects 
us to the world. 
In Chapter 3 I reinforce my above analysis by presenting a series of critical 
conclusions regarding Rorty's position. Arguing from further exposition of Davidson's 
theory of communication and Rorty's liberal political theory (which he constructs from 
his antirealists conclusions) I use the implications of Davidson's position for convention 
and community to show that Rorty's 'we', that is, his liberal community of speakers, is an 
artificially imposed boundary. Because all language users share objective truth, our 
ethnocentric differences do not reach the depth Rorty has supposed - that is, they do not 
go all the way down - we have more in common than our ability to feel pain. Rorty's 
philosophy has missed the absolute centrality of truth for language and this unfortunately 
separates linguistic communities further than they all ready are. I also discuss Frank 
Farrell's criticism that there is a deep instability within Rorty's position between 
commonsense realism and antirealism. This contradiction demonstrates how dangerously 
close Rorty veers to linguistic idealism. These difficulties provide, I argue, enough 
evidence for abandoning antirealism as a viable alternative to realism. 
We know that Rorty places antirealism as the natural outcome of 
antirepresentationalism and the only option post-correspondence. I find no good reason 
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why we should accept either of these claims. The conclusion reached in this thesis is that 
while the subject-object picture burdens realism with outdated metaphysical 
representational machinery, getting rid of it does not usher in antirealism: realism can 
survive antirepresentationalism. 
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Chapter 1 
Correspondence, Realism and Antirepresentationalism: Rorty's Antirealism 
1.1 Introduction 
Can philosophy 'get things right' or provide the thinker with an accurate picture 
of reality? The idea that it can goes as far back as Plato, who, in giving us a perceptual 
metaphor of knowing, suggested that the mind's contents mirrored a transcendent reality. 
A bifurcated reality consisting of a mind standing opposed to the world, that is, disparate 
ontological realms of belief and non-belief, needing mediation, forms the subject-object 
picture. The history of philosophy contains various attempts to meet the challenge ofhow 
the inner world of the subject and the outer reality of objects could be aligned so as to 
make knowledge possible. Today, Rorty argues, philosophy is still struggling with this 
picture's need of transcendence, which is responsible for an endless and unproductive 
philosophical debate. The picture has "held us captive. And we could not get outside of it, 
for it lay in our language and our language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." 1 
In modem philosophy consciousness was traditionally considered the medium 
between the two realms - a medium either of expression or representation. Cartesian 
philosophy is notorious for introducing this idea through its model of consciousness as a 
medium that presents mental representations of the world to its audience (the subject). 
Between the subject and the world Descartes envisioned 
the thought balloon, a free floating package of ideas that is always distinct from 
the world of matter. .. [i]t depicts representation, the mental model of the world ... 
[i]t implies interiority, popping as it does from the head ... [i]t assumes an inner 
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M Anscombe (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice Hall, 1958), p. 48, no. 115. 
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speaker or illustrator, and an inner witness. And its cloudiness suggests its 
emergence from a nonphysical dimension.2 
Descartes bequeathed a picture of the subject in direct contact with the mental, with 
sensory perceptions of the world, as opposed to the world in itself, forever putting the 
latter in doubt. What emerged was the possibility of global or 'Cartesian' skepticism, that 
is, the idea that we could be wholly wrong about the world. 
Philosophers who aimed to solve the puzzle of the subject-object picture have 
often argued for the primacy of one side of the dichotomy over the other. The realist 
versus idealist debate is one result. Realists argued that knowledge of the real world was 
the primary concern and constructed philosophical systems that aligned the subject's 
thoughts with the world (or experience). Although the realist position can be 
characterized in many ways,3 in this thesis I am concerned with realism as a general 
position and, more specifically, with the downfall of metaphysical realism. The 
traditional realist commitment can be summarized in three central theses: first, that 
objects exist; second, that these objects exist independently of our experience; third, these 
objects have features that exist independently of our descriptions. To put it another way: 
things known may continue to exist unaltered when they are not known, or that 
things may pass in and out of the cognitive relation without prejudice to their 
reality, or that the existence of a thing is not correlated with or dependent upon 
the fact that anybody experiences it, perceives it, conceives it, [speaks of it] or is 
in anyway aware ofit.4 
2 Dan Lloyd, "Popping the Thought Balloon, " in Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, ed. 
Andrew Brook, et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), p. 174. 
3 For a wide variety ofrealist positions see Susan Haack, "Realism," in Synthese, no. 7 3, 1987, pp. 275-276. 
Philosophers who view the world, without good reason, as existing as their senses tell them are called nai've 
realists. 
4 Herbert W. Schneider, "The Program and the Platform of Six Realists," in Sources of Contemporary 
Realism (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972), p. 39. 
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The realist values the intuition that there is a world 'out there' of definite character 
existing independently of language and seeks to articulate the relationship between 
language and the world so as to account for knowledge. 
Alternatively, idealists tried to solve the puzzle of the subject-object picture by 
arguing that the world was a construction of consciousness and an expression of the inner 
nature ofthe subject. Proponents of idealism refused to split reality and, therefore, 
avoided explaining truth as a relation between separate realms of belief and nonbelief. 
They moved from the failure of correspondence to defining truth as coherence; they 
explained correspondence in virtue of the latter by viewing the world as comprised of 
coherent system of representations. In redefining 'world' as a 'system ofrepresentations' 
they established 'ontological homogeneity' and thought they had outmaneuvered 
skepticism. According to Rorty, realism and idealism are related philosophical errors. It 
was the unfortunate hunt for genuine knowledge of the intrinsic nature of reality that kept 
realism and idealism together in a common philosophical pursuit. The realist-idealist 
debate continues because both positions and their oppositions are interlocked; "[t]he 
familiar trouble is, of course, that the [subject-object] disconnection creates a gap no 
reasoning ... can bridge. Once the Cartesian starting point has been chosen ... 
idealism ... empiricism, and skepticism loom. "5 
The metaphysical realist takes the realist's inclinations further; he attempts to 
mediate the cognitive and noncognitive realms by positing a noncausal relation called 
truth. In the metaphysicalist's view, knowledge is achieved by articulating objectively 
5 Donald Davidson, "The Myth of the Subjective," in Language, Truth and Religious Belief: Studies in 
Twentieth-Century Theory and Method in Religion, ed. Nancy K. Frankenberry and Hans H. Penner 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999), p. 300. 
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true sentences that correspond to (match, represent or picture) reality. He constructs a 
noncausal metaphysics of correspondence in which our truth-bearing sentences have to 
match the nonlinguistic 'truth-makers' or facts in order to have, and presumably in order 
for us to be able to explain their, 'aboutness'. G. E. Moore argued, for example, that a fact 
or "a truth is the sort of thing which corresponds to a true belief."6 Metaphysical 
correspondence radically separates truth from the realm of the mental; in other words, 
truth is 'radically nonepistemic'. 
The metaphysical realist, according to Rorty, defends an unglossable notion of 
truth that makes us mappers of something language independent; with representation the 
metaphysical realist seeks an "unclouded Mirror ofNature."7 Below we shall examine 
how the early Wittgenstein and V. W. Quine construct such metaphysics. While we can 
see that the metaphysical realist's discussion revolves around the nature of truth, realism, 
in general, incorporates any philosophical doctrine that sees genuine knowledge as 
dependent upon and 'about' an external nonlinguistic world. Realism, I argue, does not 
require a representationalist theory of truth. 
1.2 Wittgenstein's Pictures and Games 
The early Wittgenstein constructed a metaphysics of correspondence with his 
representational picture theory of meaning- meaning is truth-functional, that is, meaning 
is equivalent to what it is for a sentence to be true. Wittgenstein's picture theory conforms 
6 G. E. Moore, "Truths and Universals," in Some Main Problems of Philosophy (New York: MacMillan, 
1953),p.311. 
7 Richard Rorty, "Epistemology and the Philosophy of Language," in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 308. 
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to the subject-object picture: language can get things right and sentences can be 
objectively true if the appropriate match is struck between truth-bearing sentences and the 
truth-making facts. Wittgenstein argues that the world divides into atomic facts, or states 
of affairs, and that the world is "a totality of facts, not ofthings."8 Facts are comprised of 
objects and both exist in logical space. Wittgenstein provided the correspondence 
mechanism in the propositional function. Elementary propositions consist of names and 
assert a state of affairs; names fit variables, such as 'x', and their immediate combinations 
are functions or predications like'[] is red'. The general form of the propositional 
function is 'F[x]'. The function is the device by which the object is introduced into 
logical space and mapped. Thus, operations of the propositional function assign truth-
value to propositions by the accuracy of that mapping or correspondence; as Wittgenstein 
states "[t]he picture agrees with reality or not; it is right or wrong, true or false." 9 
Wittgenstein's architecture provides a representational account of language and 
meets the requirements of the subject-object picture. Wittgenstein's correspondence truth 
theory determines a picture's truth-value by comparing it with reality; truth is achieved 
when the logical structure of the proposition matches the formal structure of the world-
the proposition is then an accurate depiction of reality. When the propositional function 
maps the variables onto the particular range of the function- the range being a 
predication, it outlines the relationship between objects and their arrangements- it 
linguistically mirrors the existence of a state of affairs. Our mappings present to ourselves 
pictures of facts that are models of reality. Through accurate mappings we know the 
8 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, ed. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1955), p. 31, no. 1.1. 
9 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, p. 43, no. 2.21. 
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world as it is in itself; our sentences "describe the scaffolding of the world." 10 Although 
language and reality share the same logical form this means 
only that without language we could have no connected, systematic experience, 
no world. While our language determines the scope of meaningful discourse, and 
thus limits the possibilities within our world; it does not and cannot determine the 
existence or nonexistence of anything within the world. 11 
Wittgenstein thus propagates the subject-object distinction via a separation of the 
empirical and the grammatical. 12 
Wittgenstein later challenged his early representational position with his 
Philosophical Investigations. He insists, in this work, that we ignore his former position's 
narrow representational definition oflanguage. The very endeavor to solve the subject-
object picture by constructing a metaphysics of correspondence arises, accordingly, 
because we have misunderstood language. The subject-object picture provided 
philosophy with a troublesome picture of language's mediation between us and the world; 
it tempted philosophers to seek the unalterable form of the world and ask unnecessary 
questions about the essence of language; it produced "deep disquietudes; their roots as 
deep in us as the forms of our language." 13 
Wittgenstein challenged representationalism by dropping the idea that language 
"always functions in the same way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts-
which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please." 14 Instead 
10 Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, p. 165, no. 6.124. 
11 Alexander Maslow, "Objects, Atomic Facts, and Language," in A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1961), p. 23. 
12 Wittgenstein continues to 'toy' with this distinction throughout his Philosophical Investigations- see 
Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Reification of Language," in The Cambridge Companion to 
Heidegger, ed. Charles B Guignon (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 345. 
13 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 47, no. 111. 
14 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 102, no. 304. 
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of providing sentences that are 'about' or 'true of, Wittgenstein considered language to be 
a contingent, loose grouping of different socially defined linguistic behaviors. Without a 
central purpose the language to world relation was no longer an immense puzzle (which 
when properly fitted together allowed us to match reality or discover the truth of the 
world). What we call having and using a language, Wittgenstein saw as distinct 
phenomena that "have no one thing in common ... but ... are related to one another in 
many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we 
call them alllanguage." 15 
Wittgenstein's later account helps look beyond the atomism and 
representationalism of his early position; he suggested that we make everything linguistic 
intrinsically relational and opt for understanding language holistically - as inclusive to a 
"set of indefinitely expansible social practices." 16 He posits the value oflanguage in 
relation to a game, practice or society's behavioral/linguistic norms. He moves from the 
idea of language as composed of metaphysically independent relata to "the assumption 
that all [linguistic] entities are merely nodes in a net of [social] relations." 17 When we 
speak we make a move in a language game; moves are defined according to, and given 
credence by, the rules established in that very practice and are equivalent to customs or 
societal institutions. Playing such linguistic games is equivalent to living a certain way -
our language games reflect our form of life and demonstrate how interwoven it is with 
language; 
15 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 26, no. 53. 
16 Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Reification of Language," p. 344. 
17 Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Reification of Language," p. 345. 
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Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements; constructing 
an object from a description (a drawing); reporting an event; speculating about an 
event; forming and testing a hypothesis; making up a story ... reading it; play-
acting; singing catches; guessing riddles; making a joke; telling it; solving a 
problem in applied arithmetic; translating from one language into another; asking; 
thinking; cursing; greeting; praying. 18 
Without giving a systemic theory of meaning, Wittgenstein posits the significance 
of a sentence in its actual relations to other sentences; "whether a sentence had sense did 
indeed depend upon whether another sentence was true - a sentence about the social 
practices of the people who used the marks and noises which were components of the 
sentence." 19 Meaning lies in a variety of conventional social linguistic practices - though 
variable, every word exists in a web (or family) of meanings. Words are given meaning 
given their place in the holistic organic mesh that is our linguistic behavior. Language, 
like a game, remains something to be mastered and thus separates the indoctrinated from 
the outsiders. We understand particular words in relation to a particular training; without 
particular training words can mean anything, or, alternatively, they can mean nothing at 
all. 
The later Wittgenstein has no systemic theory of truth either. Wittgenstein likens 
correspondence to a mechanism in which propositions (cogs) that engage with 'truth'; this 
contact produces (chums out) 'contact with' and 'truths about' the world. Thinking oftruth 
as correspondence as the only form of contact with reality is equivalent to saying 
'The king in chess is the piece that one can check.' But this means no more than 
that in our game of chess we only check the king. Just as the proposition that only 
a proposition can be true or false can say no more than that we only predicate 
'true' or 'false' of what we call a proposition.20 
18 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 11, no. 23. 
19 Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Reification of Language," p. 344. 
20 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 52, no. 136. 
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Language outlines the nature of our socially institutionalized practices; as such, it is 
unrelated to objectivity. Instead of philosophically high minded ideas of mirroring or 
corresponding, Wittgenstein suggests alternatively that language functions on the 
practical level as a tool for coping with the world; he wants us to think of the functions of 
words as varied and as diverse as the functions of tools in a tool box. We cannot justify 
how or why we speak the way we do in relation to 'getting things right' - all we can say 
is that these are the tools we use: "[t]his is simply what I do." 21 If we ask how it is that 
our tools engage with the world or help us cope, Wittgensteinians (e.g. Rorty) liken 
language to an animal's horns or survival behaviors like burrowing. Rather than 
representing, a sentence's truth-value is determined by the appropriateness of the 
speaker's linguistic move within the game in which she is situated- as there are many 
moves within many (a possibly infinite number of) language games there are as many 
truths. In our game we surround the notion of 'truth' with specific practices, rules and 
beliefs but these remain simply our practices. We are in contact with reality all the time 
but formalize it in our practice in particular (and unnecessary) ways. Wittgenstein 
continues to separate what we say (the grammatical) from what is (the empirical realm). 
The world exists independently of language but when we speak we obey a custom that 
has no value in relation to a philosophy of representation. 
The analysis ofWittgenstein's rejection of his earlier model oflanguage yields 
insight into how a representational picture is constructed and abandoned. The later 
Wittgenstein challenges the assumption that language is a representational medium; by 
developing an increasingly naturalized account he drops the metaphysical notions of 
21 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 85, no. 217. 
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meaning and correspondence to the facts. Language is something to be mastered; 
meaning isolates communities of convention. Wittgenstein leaves, however, serious 
questions as to the possibility of objectivity. 
1.3 Tarski's Truth Theory 
Alfred Tarski's work constructing truth theories for formallanguages22 greatly 
influenced the positions of Quine, Davidson and Rorty. An adequate truth theory, for 
Tarski, accounts for all the uses (or the extension) of the predicate 'is true' in relation to 
the sentences of a given language L. To do so, Tarski argues, it must abide by 
Convention T. Convention T gives us the minimum criterion needed to develop a truth 
theory or define 'truth' for L and provides two constraints on a truth theory. First, all 
sentences of language L will be provable in the T -sentence theorem '(T) The sentences of 
L is true if and only if p'. Second, all sentences provable in the T -sentence theorem are 
true. Any definition of truth must satisfy these two constraints. Guided by Convention T 
we can construct a truth theory by producing a list of all 'true' sentences or by recursively 
generating such sentences from logical axioms. Convention T sets the parameters for 
constructing a truth theory for language L. Each T -sentence is a partial definition; the 
totality ofT -sentences gives us a theory of truth for a particular language. 
In place of a correspondence truth theory Tarski has a leaner notion of satisfaction, 
which, although extensional, makes reference "nothing but a semantic abstraction. "23 
Tarski considers truth to be a characteristic of sentences. Sentences start out open and are 
22 Alfred Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages," in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956). 
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closed when they are satisfied. An open sentence is 'x loves y' and a closed sentence is 
'Jack loves Jill'. Sentences are satisfied as functions are filled. Thus filled the function f 
satisfies "an unstructured n-place predicate with variables in its n-places if the predicate 
is true ofthe entities (in order) that the function assigns to those variables."24 A sentence 
is satisfied when the objects are mapped onto the sentence by the sentential function; 
Whether or not a particular function satisfies a sentence depends entirely on what 
entities it assigns to the free variables of the sentence. [F]unctions ... map the 
variables of the object language on to the entities over which they range .... 25 
At the base of a truth theory are the axioms that are satisfied by all sequences or objects; 
this reveals a first order quantificational structure. Complex sentences are built out of 
these axioms. For a complex satisfied sentence to be true it has to be recursively tested 
against the basic axioms out of which it was built -
the recursive characterization of satisfaction must run through every primitive 
predicate in tum. It copes with connectives in the obvious way; thus a conjunction 
of two sentences s and t (open or closed) is satisfied by f provided f satisfies s and 
f satisfies t. 26 
Closed sentences that meet the recursive test are true. Tarski's truth theories could 
not explain or define a particular truth for L without satisfaction. As we shall see, Tarski's 
truth theory is used as a basis for a theory of communication, explicates semantic 
relations between meaning, belief and truth and it is seen, by some philosophers, as a way 
to limit unnecessary philosophical theorizing about truth. 
23 Bjorn Ramberg, "Reference," in Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1989), p. 34. 
24 Donald Davidson, "True to the Facts," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), p. 47. 
25 Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 47. 
26 Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 47. 
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1.4 Quine's Schemes 
Quine, Davidson's analytic forebearer, set out in his paper "The Two Dogmas of 
Empiricism" to improve empiricism, a position which holds that the contents of the 
senses serve as the ultimate evidence for the truth of our sentences. Quine did so by 
explicitly challenging two dogmas: the analytic/synthetic distinction and reductionism. 
The analytic/synthetic distinction focuses on the traditional distinction between 
sentences that are true by virtue of their meaning alone and sentences whose truth 
depends upon the facts. Quine finds the substitutes of synonymy and definition 
insufficient to explain the concept of analytical truth and drops the idea of meaning and 
the possibility of confirming the truth of sentences individually. Instead, Quine opts for a 
holism in which there is no significant distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. 
Reductionism is also rejected on the basis of Quine's holism. Quine denied the possibility 
that individual sentences are (or could be reduced to) empirically significant units of 
language. For Quine it is our entire body of theory- our conceptual scheme- that meets 
experience as a whole. 
However, Davidson would go on to argue that Quine's project is not at an end 
because empiricism contains a third dogma, that is, scheme-content dualism. Quine's 
success at destroying the first two dogmas, Davidson argues, drives us straight into the 
third dogma: 
The dualism of the synthetic and the analytic is a dualism of sentences some of 
which are true (or false) both because of what they mean and because of their 
empirical content, while others are true (or false) by virtue of meaning alone, 
having no empirical content. Ifwe give up the dualism, we abandon the 
conception of meaning that goes with it, but we do not have to abandon the idea 
of empirical content: we can hold, if we want, that all sentences have empirical 
content. Empirical content is in tum explained by reference to the facts, the world, 
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experience, sensation, the totality of sensory stimuli, or something similar ... Thus 
in place of the analytic-synthetic we get the dualism of scheme and content. 27 
What is a conceptual scheme? Quine envisions a theory (or language) as a 
transcendental organizing scheme. This scheme serves to provide a representational 
medium between a diametrically opposed subject and world (as such, the third dogma is a 
continuation of the traditional subject-object dichotomy). The scheme organizes the 
content of experience (a.k.a. sensory promptings, data). Content is essential for without it 
thoughts (or sentences) "are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."28 In Quine's 
model, the contents of experience take the place of traditionally troublesome facts, that is, 
as epistemological intermediaries between language and what it is 'about'. The medium 
presents to the subject sentences that have been matched (and, therefore, been given 
truth-values) to the proximal content that language has, reciprocally, organized. This 
means that our ontology is based on our scheme's particular organization, so the familiar 
objects of our world- trees, rocks, rain, etc. -are constructions that are "conceptually 
imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries ... simply as irreducible posits 
comparable, epistemologically, to the gods ofHomer."29 In this way, a scheme makes 'the 
world' intelligible by constructing a relative ontology - what is real in our scheme may 
not be so in another. A scheme that organizes content in a manner significantly different 
than our own (to the point where these differences impede communication) is 
incommensurable. 
27 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 189. 
28 Immanuel Kant, "Introduction: Idea ofTranscendental Logic," in The Critique of Pure Reason, translated 
by Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1950), p. 93, A51/B75. 
29 W. V. 0. Quine, "Two Dogma's of Empiricism," in From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, MA: The 
Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 44. 
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Quine objects to the traditional model of meaning inherent in the analytic-
synthetic distinction; Quine calls such an appeal the 'idea idea' or 'museum myth' model 
"in which the exhibits are meanings and the words are labels. To switch languages is to 
change the labels. "30 The older model was problematic in divorcing semantics from the 
world. Quine claims that it 
is obvious that truth in general depends on both language and extralinguistic fact. 
The statement 'Brutus killed Caesar' would be false if the world had been different 
in certain ways, but it would also be false if the word 'killed' happened to rather 
have the sense of 'be gat'. Thus one is tempted to suppose in general that the truth 
of a statement is somehow analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual 
component. .. .it next seems reasonable that in some statements the factual 
component is null; and these are the analytic statements. But, for all its a priori 
reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has 
not been drawn. 31 
And, like the later Wittgenstein, Quine challenges one-to-one correspondence between 
theory/sentences and facts. He is opposed to reductionism and its verificationist theory of 
meaning, in which each statement "is associated [with] a unique range ofpossible 
sensory events such that the occurrence of any one of them would add to the likelihood of 
truth of the statement. "32 The verificationist theory appeals to facts and, in doing so, 
reinforces the analytic-synthetic distinction. Because we can make no sense of separating 
the truth of a sentence into its linguistic and factual components, Quine abandons the idea 
of atomistic correspondence (facts) in favor of holistic confrontation (via sense data). Our 
30 W.V.O. Quine, "Ontological Relativity," in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: The 
Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 26. 
31 Quine, "Two Dogma's of Empiricism," p. 36. 
32 Quine, "Two Dogma's of Empiricism," pp. 40-41. 
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sentences are measured against the 'tribunal' of experience "not individually but only as 
corporate body. "33 
Quine thinks we are better off without 'meaning'. Understanding language and 
meaning holistically means understanding linguistic relations in an all-encompassing 
causal web of relations. Where the later Wittgenstein refused to give a systemic theory of 
meaning, Quine challenges 'meaning' by turning from epistemology to semantics: 
the question whether two expressions are alike or unlike in meaning has no 
determinate answer, known or unknown, expect insofar as the answer is settled in 
principle by people's speech dispositions, known or unknown.34 
Understanding the meaning of a foreign speaker (or native) becomes a matter of 
understanding speech dispositions from within a linguistic-causal nexus, that is, it 
becomes a matter of translation. 
Radical translation is a heuristic tool built from scratch, that is, it is translation 
without previous exposure to the linguistic behavior (and meaning) of a speaker's alien 
tongue. Translation is a relation between two languages that can and often does involve 
up to three languages, that is, the object language, the subject language, and the 
metalanguage; these are "the languages from and into which translation proceeds, and the 
language of the theory, which says what expressions of the subject language translate 
which expressions ofthe object language." 35 Quine's method of translation proceeds by 
providing a syntactical equation of sentences along Tarskian lines. The translator is 
guided by the criterion that in any translation (radical or otherwise) "what it is for a 
33 Quine, "Two Dogma's of Empiricism," p. 41. 
34 Quine, "Two Dogma's of Empiricism," p. 29. 
35 Donald Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), p. 129. 
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speaker to belong to a given speech community is that translation manuals that work for 
the community work for him." 36 To translate effectively we need a listing of translations 
of the object language's sentences s into the sentences p of the subject language (L). The 
translation manual we need is a potentially infinite listing of the analytic hypotheses's in 
L translates into p'. All intelligible translation occurs against a 'background theory' or 
one's own language; "the universe of a theory makes sense only relative to some 
background theory, and only relative to some choice of a manual of translation of one 
theory into the other. "37 A translation scheme requires an understood tongue or 
metalanguage (English or whatever home language one has - in which the translator 
already understands the meaning of sentences), only then can one understand the 
meaning of sentences translated from the object language to the subject language; only 
then can we say that we are translating properly. 
We translate even when communicating within the confines of our own language. 
For example, the sentence 'Snow is white' is taken as uttered in the object language 
English or 'E'. This sentence is to be translated into the subject language (which also 
happens to be 'E') via the language of the theory (which again is English) or 
metalanguage 'meta-E'. When I define "'true in E' in meta-E in such a way that 'Snow is 
white' is true in E if and only if snow is white ... each sentence ofE is to be translated 
'homophonically' into meta-E."38 In other words, each sentence ofE gives it own 
translation into an equivalent sentence in meta-E. To translate in this way is to take one's 
36 Donald Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," in Perspectives on Quine, eds. Robert B. Barrett, eta!. 
(Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 71. Also see: Donald Davidson, "Thought and Talk," in Inquiries 
into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 161. 
37 Quine, "Ontological Relativity," pp. 54-55. 
38 Hilary Putnam, "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," in Words and Life (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 338. 
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own language at face value or its meanings as transparent and self-evident - it is a 
'disquotational. .. procedure'.39 Nonetheless, it is still only 'true-in-L'. 
Without a traditional theory of meaning, even with the Tarskian translation tool, 
the interpreter only has access to what is observable in the natural world. Observable 
behavior is understood as very general attitudes towards sentences confirmed by "the 
objective forces that [the interpreter] sees impinging on the native's surfaces."40 They 
combine to form 'observation' sentences and are all the basic evidence an interpreter can 
rely upon in constructing a theory of radical interpretation. Observation sentences are the 
key to translation; they are particular sentences that we directly associate with the 
presence of particular stimuli. Such sentences remain tied to the proximal sensory stimuli 
and their 'observational' aspect is identifiable merely by the behavioral criterion of assent 
by members of the same speech community. Observational sentences achieve assent by 
stimulating "the same total set ofreceptors"41 on differing occasions; such sentences are 
to be understood in purely causal-behavioral terms. 
We can equate sentences of different tongues because meaning is dependent upon 
proximal stimulations. Quine's proximal theory of reference ties meaning and belief to a 
mutual dependence upon the firing of sensory nerves -that is, it ties the two to "a brain 
state or change ... [which] remains reassuringly physical and publicly observable, at least 
39 Putnam, "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," p. 338. 
40 W.V.O. Quine, "Translation and Meaning," in Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1969), p. 27. 
41 W.V.O. Quine, "Empirical Content," in Theories and Things (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1981), p. 
25. 
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in principle. "42 Meaning is thus 'stimulus meaning' and it provides a measure of the 
sameness of meaning: 
Two observation sentences have the same meaning for a speaker if the patterns of 
stimulation that cause assent to one sentence cause assent to the other; similarly 
for dissent. An observation sentence s of one speaker has the same meaning as the 
sentence T of another speaker if the prompting patterns are approximately the 
same. This is the foundation of radical translation.43 
This background allows the translator to begin the process of constructing a translation 
manual; he disassembles 
heard utterances into conveniently short recurrent parts, and thus compiles a list 
of native 'words'. Various ofthese he hypothetically equates to English words and 
phrases .... Such are his analytic hypotheses.44 
Their totality, in relation to radical translation, constitutes Quine's dictionaries/translation 
manuals. Stimulus meaning suffices to give an adequate account of meaning without 
'meaning' (and, indeed, without the concept of objective truth). 
Quine argues that because the causal-semantic account of meaning so heavily 
depends upon observation sentences it necessarily requires a complementary account of 
language learning: a model where words (and, later, sentences) are learned "through the 
conditioning of sounds or verbal behavior to appropriate bits of [observable] matter in the 
public domain. "45 This conditioning is the original relation by which our terms and 
comprised sentences gain meaning. Observation sentences are the gateway to language; 
when we learn a language there has to be an arrangement that will allow the learner to 
hear the sound, see the object and see that the speaker sees the object. This allows the 
42 Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," p. 68. 
43 Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," pp. 71-72. 
44 Quine, "Translation and Meaning," p. 68. 
45 Davidson, "The Myth of the Subjective," p. 301. 
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speaker to "key them [observation sentences] to current episodes ... because other 
speakers, whom we imitate and who encourage our own behavior, have associated the 
sentence with those same ranges of concurrent impingement. "46 Although language is 
largely learned by mastering linguistic relations "somewhere there have to be nonverbal 
reference points ... associated with the appropriate utterance on the spot."47 The 'bits of 
matter' are important because they provide common ground; " .. .in their intersubjective 
intermediacy they are basic ... to language learning, because we learn a language from 
other people in shared circumstances. "48 Yet Quine's model of learning is not based upon 
a Kripkean building block theory of reference: the attempt to build up referential chains 
starting with relations between simple units of language, that is, words and predicates, 
and things, and then proceeding on to complex and compounded units, sentences, etc., so 
as to explain satisfaction and truth.49 We do not understand sentences in isolation but 
holistically; as Putnam explains: 
I 'understand' the sentence 'Snow is white' in the sense that using that sentence in 
response to certain stimuli ... is part of the complex, multi-tracked disposition 
which is my understanding of the language as a whole. 50 
But language is not learned or mastered in 'one mad scramble'51 for such is indeed 
impossible. 
When we learn a language we learn what the utterances of speakers in that 
language mean and this requires that we learn "what observations to count as evidence 
46 W.V.O. Quine, "Breaking into Language," in The Roots of Reference (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 
1973 ), p. 42. 
47 Quine, "Breaking into Language," p. 37. 
48 Quine, "Breaking into Language," p. 36. 
49 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
50 Putnam, "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," p. 334. 
51 Donald Davidson, "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages," in Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 7. 
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for and against them. The evidence relation and the semantical relation of observation to 
theory are coextensive. "52 Learning to speak a new language and trying to determine 
what another person means by their utterances are not distinct processes. Quine has 
shown that we cannot identify meaning in isolation and has demonstrated the relevance 
of the semantic context (over the epistemological) in understanding meaning and 
communication. Quine's success, according to Davidson, saved the philosophy of 
language "as a serious subject by showing how it could be pursued without what there 
cannot be: determinate meanings. "53 
Quine's model leads to the inscrutability ofreference and indeterminacy of 
translation. Reference is inscrutable for it is unclear and, in principle, impossible to 
determine the objective nature of the source of stimuli which reciprocally provide 
stimulus meaning; translation is indeterminate for it is, again, unclear and, in principle, 
impossible to determine which translation is an accurate one. As an interpreter it "is 
important to think of what prompts the native's assent ... as stimulations"54 and to 
remember that we do not have access to their world - their ontology is equally relative to 
their own language. When we attempt to translate a totally foreign tongue no exact 
translation is possible; a variety of equally good candidates will present themselves 
because we cannot appeal to 'real' objects as an objective measure of translatory adequacy. 
In guessing the possible reference points of utterances we can develop too many. Because 
all we have is stimulus meaning, what our words mean, like the objects we employ, is 
52 Quine, "Breaking into Language," p. 38. 
53 Donald Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," in Reading Rorty, ed. Alan R. 
Malachowski (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 126. 
54 Quine, "Translation and Meaning," p. 30. 
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relative to our scheme. It is only in relation to our own background theory or language 
that can we translate a native's linguistic reactions to stimulations. References are, in 
Quine's view, equivalent to mythological posits. The best we can do in communication is 
to align the other's utterances (stated in an object language) with those of our own 
language (both subject and metalanguage) and chalk up communication problems to 
incommensurability. Quine considers these problems manageable and illuminative of the 
illegitimacy of the traditional notion of meaning; for Davidson, these problems are "a 
predicament from which we should take conceptual warning. "55 
Following Wittgenstein, Quine's empiricism is a holistic enterprise that threatens 
objectivity. Without one-to-one correspondence our statements face the tribunal of sense 
experience together but not all equally; only those at the periphery (observation sentences) 
have to be kept square with experience. Nevertheless, in Quine's view, individual 
sentences do not "admit separately of observational evidence. Sentences interlock. An 
observation may refute some chunk of theory comprising of a cluster of sentences"56 
while leaving the rest of the language intact. Furthermore, a partial refutation does not tell 
us which sentences to abandon. This means for Quine that the evidence relation, as well 
as the semantic relation, is indirect. Because different theories can account for and 
organize the entire corpus of observation sentences differently, Quine allows that 
a speaker or thinker at a given time operates with one theory, and for him at that 
time, the theory he is using is true and the other theory false. If he shifts to the 
alternative theory, then it becomes true and the previously accepted theory 
becomes false. 57 
55 Bjorn Ramberg, "What is a Theory of Truth?" in Donald Davidson's Philosophy of Language (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 7. 
56 Quine, "Translation and Meaning," p. 38. 
57 Donald Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXXXVII, no. 
6, June 1990, p. 306. 
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This means that the truth of sentences can only be articulated with a theory. Because we 
can not get past our home language or scheme the "idea that truth and falsity are 
substantive properties which sentences in any language possess independently of the 
point of view of the interpreter must be given up. "58 The measure of truth of a scientific 
theory now "depends only on how well it serves to explain or predict true observation 
sentences. "59 Quine's position proposes as many 'truths' about the world as there are 
theories; any sentence can be held true depending on the theory that is in place. Quine's 
empiricism opts for the primacy of evidence over truth; empiricism makes 
epistemologically significant "the obvious causal role of the senses in mediating between 
objects, our thoughts and talk about them; empiricism locates the ultimate evidence for 
those thoughts at this intermediary step. "60 Quine uses stimulations to tie meaning to 
evidence; the latter underlies the notion of a tribunal of sense experience against which 
our theory's truth is measured. Because evidence is primary but unconditioned (only to be 
made intelligible by the organizing scheme) Quine can treat truth epistemically and 
reduce it to the intratheoretical. 
Quine's model also raises the problems of ontological relativity and skepticism. 
Many worlds are possible because beyond content there is something sitting 'out there' 
which is by its very essence ineffable. The model requires something like a radically non-
epistemic Kantian noumenal realm outside language; the model requires "the notion of 
something completely unspecified and unspecifiable- the thing in itself, in fact." 61 
58 Putnam, "A Comparison of Something With Something Else," p. 336. 
59 Putnam, "A Comparison of Something With Something Else," p. 306. 
60 Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," p. 68. 
61 Richard Rorty, "The World Well Lost," in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 15. 
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Skepticism rears as holistic confrontation fares no better with the world than traditional 
one-to-one correspondence theory. Because organized contents are causally connected to 
sensory stimulations only, there are, 
if we stick to the proximal theory, no guarantees that we have even a roughly 
correct view of a public world. Although each speaker may be content that his 
view is the true one, since it squares with all his stimulations, once he notices how 
globally mistaken others are, and why, it is hard to think why he would not 
wonder whether he had it right. Then he might wonder what it could mean to get 
it right. 62 
Like sentences and facts, scheme and content are so diametrically opposed that it is hard 
to see how they could ever be brought together. How can language get a handle on 
content? There is no way to determine how "a move within a scheme is answerable to the 
deliverances of the senses."63 The skeptic recognizes that even a justified theory can still 
be false. To base meaning on evidence "necessarily leads to the difficulties of proximal 
theories: truth relativized to individuals, and skepticism. Proximal theories, no matter 
how decked out, are Cartesian in spirit and consequence. "64 According to Davidson, 
Quine's position simply invites a rehash of global error; because Quine's model 
... depended on something intermediate between its supposed object in the world 
and belief, skepticism was inevitable. This was ironic, of course, since one motive 
to turning to such 'evidence' as sense data was the fact that, not being 
propositional in character, no doubts about them could be raised.65 
62 Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," p. 74. 
63 Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," p. 89. 
64 Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," p. 76. 
65 Donald Davidson, "Reply to John McDowell," in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Lewis Edwin 
Hahn, (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), p. 105. 
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1.5 Antirepresentationalism 
Frustration with the inability of representational models (whether one-to-one or 
holistic) to deliver on their promises of correspondence led many philosophers to 
question the viability of representation. Davidson abandons representationalism as a 
means for constructing a theory of objective truth and getting from language to the world; 
Rorty goes further and abandons the realist program altogether. 
In Davidson's view, scheme-content dualism is an invitation for skepticism that 
demonstrates how little philosophy has traveled: 
skepticism rests on the assumption neither of sense data nor of reductionism, but 
on the much more general idea that empirical knowledge requires an 
epistemological step between the world as we conceive it and our conception of it, 
and this idea is at the heart of Quine's proximal theory.66 
Taking lessons from the increasingly naturalized and causal accounts of the language to 
world relation, Davidson challenges the representationalism of Quine's scheme-content 
dualism. Conceptual scheme theory, Davidson argues, is unintelligible because of its 
appeal to truth-makers; that appeal 
betrays an underlying paradox. Different points of view make sense, but only if 
there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them; yet the existence of 
a common system belies the claim of dramatic incomparability.67 
Davidson follows Quine in understanding the meaning of sentences in the semantic 
context of translation. Differences between conceptual schemes are recognizable upon a 
total failure oftranslation; that failure 
is a necessary condition for difference of conceptual schemes; the common 
relation to experience or the evidence is what is supposed to help us make sense 
of the claim that it is languages or schemes that are under consideration when 
66 Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," p. 74. 
67 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 184. 
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translation fails. It is essential to this idea that there be something neutral and 
common that lies outside all schemes. 68 
Davidson's rejection of scheme-content dualism is based on his objection to one-
to-one correspondence truth theory, which requires a theory of individuated facts. 
Atomistic theories of reference open up the possibility that we might get things all wrong. 
Reference is a central part ofthe epistemological problem of representationalism. Like 
Quine, Davidson abandons the Kripkean 'Building-Block' approach to reference. To take 
the constituents of sentences as the significant units for truth is to "make abstractions 
serve as the explanatory foundations of their own source. That source is the truth value of 
sentences. "69 Davidson argues that unless we find a way other than correspondence to 
identify facts we will not be able to use facts to explain truth. Davidson agrees with C. I. 
Lewis and Gottlob Frege that "if true sentences correspond to anything at all; it must be 
the universe as a whole; thus, all true sentences correspond to the same thing."70 If we 
cannot identify what fact a sentence corresponds to we might be better off talking about 
'one big fact' instead of facts; 
Descriptions like 'the fact that there are stupas in Nepal', if they describe anything 
at all, describe the same thing: The Great Fact. No point remains in distinguishing 
among various names of The Great Fact when written after 'corresponds to'; we 
may as well settle for the single phrase 'corresponds to the Great Fact'. 71 
Correspondence of a sentences to the 'Great Fact' is no more than saying's is true'; this 
line of thought trivializes the notion of correspondence. According to Davidson, there is 
no entity that makes a sentence true; 
68 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 190. 
69 Ramberg, "Reference," p. 34. 
70 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 303. 
71 Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 42. 
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Nothing, however, no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, 
not surface irritations, not the world, can make a sentence true. That experience 
takes a certain course, that our skin is warmed or punctured, that the universe is 
finite, these facts, if we like to talk that way, make sentences and theories true. 
But this point is put better without mention of facts. The sentence 'My skin is 
warm' is true if and only if my skin is warm. Here there is no reference to a fact, 
an experience, or a piece of evidence.72 
Atomistic theories of correspondence and reference are thrown out because neither plays 
an informative role in explaining the language to world relation. This is not to say that 
there are no causal intermediaries between language and the world but just that none of 
them have epistemological significance. This attack on facts is the basis of Davidson's 
antirepresentationalism. 
Davidson refuses to accept confrontation appeals on either the atomistic or 
holistic levels. Any holistic appeal is still an appeal to truth-makers. An appeal to 'the 
totality of experience' is equivalent to claims concerning 'fitting the facts': neither adds 
anything to the concept of a language being true nor provides a means by which to test 
conceptual schemes. We cannot individuate a scheme's ability to fit an entity called 'the 
tribunal of sense experience' and so our description of an incommensurable conceptual 
scheme is "largely true but not translatable."73 
1. 6 Antirealism 
Rorty's antirealism is greatly influenced by Davidson's antirepresentationalism; it 
shows, Rorty argues, the way out of the subject-object picture because it establishes an 
'arch antirealist' position; it is 
72 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 194. 
73 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 194. 
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the first systematic treatment of language that breaks completely with the notion 
of language as something that can be adequate or inadequate to the world or to the 
self. ... [it] breaks with the notion that language is a medium- a medium either of 
. f . 74 representatiOn or o expressiOn. 
The collapse of the subject-object picture, according to Rorty, replaced the 
struggle between idealism and realism with a "struggle between the pragmatists (who 
wanted to dissolve the old problems) and the anti-pragmatists (who still thought there 
was something first-order to fight about)."75 Today's representationalists still maintain the 
intuition of a nonlinguistic world of objects with independent character and hope to 
figure out our relationship to it; thus, they inherit the burden of the realist-idealist debate. 
They still find representationalism, matters of fact and skepticism "fruitful and 
interesting". 76 The new pragmatists argue that because correspondence truth theory has 
been shown to be an uncashable and outworn metaphor antirepresentationalism is 
synonymous with antirealism. 
When realists insist that we still have to attend to the world, the skeptic argues 
that we have "no way to hold onto the world in one hand and our descriptions of it in the 
other and compare the two ... to get outside language games." 77 The skeptic pressures us 
to acknowledge that the representationalist position requires that "the world ... [be] 
available to us only under a description ... [and] the realization that it exists without a 
description, that it has no language of its own that we might one day leam."78 Only 
74 Richard Rorty, "The Contingency of Language," in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 10. 
75 Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Philosophical 
Papers: Volume I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 149. 
76 Richard Rorty, "Introduction: Antirepresentationalism, Ethnocentrism and Liberalism," in Objectivity, 
Relativism and Truth, Philosophical Papers: Volume I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 2. 
77 Richard Rorty, "Cavell on Skepticism," in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 180. 
78 Rorty, "Cavell on Skepticism," p. 185. 
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realists, Rorty argues, worry about skepticism; antirealists drop the representationalist 
picture that feeds skepticism. An antirealist retains no notion "which would enable him 
to make sense of the claim that if we achieved everything we ever hoped to achieve by 
making assertions we might still be making false assertions, failing to correspond to 
something." 79 
In the essay "The World Well Lost" Rorty introduces his early antirealist position 
as a challenge to the Kantian model of the mind. While Rorty's earlier position ultimately 
proved to have 'idealist' difficulties it is still instructive. Kant's transcendental philosophy 
included a search for conditions of possibility as a means for establishing first philosophy; 
if one can give a priori conditions of experienceability then one could deliver "apodeictic 
truths ... [ & ] the Kantian distinction between a priori and apodeictic and the a posteriori 
and relative would remain secure."80 In the Kantian model, the mind contains active 
spontaneous faculties and passive receptive faculties; the former utilize the realm of the 
categories and are supposed to be capable of shaping the neutral material presented to it 
via the receptive faculties. Shaping is necessary for the "latter objects need to be related 
by the former ... before they become available, before they can be experienced or 
described;" 81 this relating produces a phenomenal world for the subject. 
Kant's model is open to the possibility of different worlds and skepticism; the 
possibility of different conceptual schemes highlights the fact that a Kantian 
unsynthesized intuition can exert no influence on how it is to be synthesized - or, 
at best, can exert only an influence we shall have to describe in a way as relative 
to a chosen conceptual scheme as our description of everything else. Insofar as a 
Kantian intuition is effable, it is just a perceptual judgment, and thus not merely 
79 Richard Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," in Consequences of Pragmatism 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. xxiv. 
80 Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Reification of Language," p. 341. 
81 Rorty, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger and the Reification of Language," p. 342. 
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'intuitive.' Insofar as it is ineffable, it is incapable of having an explanatory 
function. 82 
Such problems suggest, to Rorty, that we should drop the notion of receptivity and stop 
dividing the mind into parts. Without the faculty of receptivity, Rorty argues, "the notion 
of a neutral material becomes dubious ... doubt spreads easily to the notion of conceptual 
thought as 'shaping'."83 
Rorty seeks "a simple theory ofthe eye of the mind either getting, or failing to get, 
a clear view of the natures ofkinds ofthings."84 Representations, accordingly, are to be 
given up in favor of directly describing the world. Rejecting receptivity and nonepistemic 
neutral material delivers, according to Rorty, a beneficial trivialization of the word 
'world'. Rorty asks that we choose between two attitudes towards the world- the 
radically nonepistemic and the pragmatic: 
I want to claim that 'the world' is either the purely vacuous notion of the ineffable 
cause of sense and goal of intellect, or else a name for the objects that inquiry at 
the moment is leaving alone: those planks in the boat which are at the moment not 
being moved about ... epistemology since Kant has shuttled back and forth 
between these two meanings ofthe term 'world'. 85 
Rorty prefers the second attitude, though this position is not meant to be a metaphysical 
thesis nor a redefinition of the object of knowledge. In Rorty's view, the world still 
determines the content ofbelief; but all that 
'determination' comes to is that our belief that snow is white is true because snow 
is white, that our beliefs about the stars are true because of the way the stars are 
laid out, and so on. 86 
82 Rorty, "The World Well Lost," p. 4. 
83 Rorty, "The World Well Lost," p. 4. 
84 Rorty, "The World Well Lost," p. 15. 
85 Rorty, "The World Well Lost," p. 15. 
86 Rorty, "The World Well Lost," p. 14. 
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We can hold onto a 'common-sense' notion ofthe world as the collection of natural 
objects like cats, dogs, trees and people; but this commonsense holism does not commit 
us to any belief in correspondence to a reality independent ofbelief. 
Rorty's early position contains a serious problem he appears to iron out in his later 
antirealism. "The World Well Lost" was criticized as a migration into subjectivity.87 
Rorty agreed that his position did "takes sides between subject and object, mind and 
world ... trying to glorify us at the expense of the world." 88 Rorty's later antirealism takes 
no sides but "tries to erase the contrast between them ... trying to lose both us and the 
world." 89 
The 'real world', according to Rorty, is an unnecessary article of metaphysical 
faith. Since 'linguistic items do not represent any nonlinguistic items'90 no description is 
an accurate representation of anything; we have here a "repudiation of the very idea of 
anything- mind or matter, self or world- having an intrinsic nature to be expressed or 
represented. "91 This repudiation suggests two possible forms for Rorty's mature 
antirealism; internal realism and strong antirealism. Rorty argues that his antirealism is an 
internal realism; following Putnam, internal realism is a "common sense realism: the 
realism that says that mountains and stars are not created by language and thought, and 
are not parts of language and thought, and yet can be described by language and 
87 Frank Farrell, "Rorty and Antirealism," in Rorty & Pragmatism, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp, 
Jr. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), p. 175. 
88 Richard Rorty, "Response to Farrell," in Rorty & Pragmatism, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. (Nashville: 
Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), p. 191. 
89 Rorty, "Response to Farrell," p. 191. 
90 Richard Rorty, "Taylor on Truth," in Philosophy in an Age of Pluralism: The Philosophy of Charles 
Taylor in Question, ed. James Tully (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 2. 
91 Rorty, "The Contingency of Language," p. 4. 
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thought. "92 We have no trouble telling what our words or sentences refer to even though 
semantical notions (reference and satisfaction) are intratheoretical. But from another 
perspective Rorty is a 'strong antirealist', for he denies that there is something underneath 
texts which texts are trying to convey; he "not only denies that the scientist puts us in 
touch with a transcendental intrinsic nature of the world; he doubts that there is an 
intrinsic nature of the world waiting to be discovered."93 For this Rorty, there is no way 
the World is. Given the difficulties inherent in Rorty's position, which I discuss in 
Chapter 3, I find the latter characterization as the only one that fits. 
92 Hilary Putnam, "The Question of Realism," in Words and Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1994), p. 303. 
93 Tom Sorell, "The World from Its Own Point of View," in Reading Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 11. 
36 
Chapter 2 
Disquotation, Interpretation and Truth: Establishing Modest Realism 
2.1 Nullifying Truth 
In Rorty's view, antirepresentationalism permits us to replace representation and 
objective truth with a naturalistic account oflinguistic activity as a tool, as means of 
coping. Such an account sees both body and speech as mutually evolved from the causal 
forces at play in the environment. In Rorty's model our vocalizations bring us no closer to 
nor make us more aware of that outer world "of things than do an anteater's snout or the 
bower-bird's skill at weaving." 1 
Rorty's objections against realism's conception of truth include, first, that 
metaphysical realism's appeal to facts appears to be an appeal to mysterious properties 
that "stand behind- both in the sense of remaining invisibly in the background and in the 
sense of guaranteeing - our ordinary ways of speaking and acting. "2 The ontological 
status of facts is unclear. Second, correspondence is mysterious because it relies upon the 
idea ofnoncausal relations. These relations provide access to an objective, noncausal 
'truth about the world' and put us in contact with a supposed non-epistemic reality - the 
world outside the mental or linguistic realm. Rorty doubts whether anyone could ever 
recognize such a confrontation, let alone measure its adequacy. The idea of a 'truth-
maker' engaging with a 'truth-bearer' summons a curious 
1 Richard Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," in The Journal of Philosophy, Volume XC, no. 9, 
September 1993, pp. 447-448. 
2 Hilary Putnam, "Sense, Nonsense and the Senses: An Inquiry into the Powers of the Human Mind," in 
Journal of Philosophy, XCI, no. 9, September 1994, p. 507. 
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mechanism outside the causal order of the physical world, a mechanism which 
could have or lack a quasi-causal property with which one might identify truth. 
Thus to say that our conceptual scheme is 'adequate to the world', is to suggest 
that some cogs and gears are meshing nicely - cogs and gears which are either 
nonphysical or which, though physical, are not mentioned in the rest of our causal 
story. To suggest, with the skeptic, that our language game may have nothing to 
do with the way the world is, is to call up a picture of a gear wheel so out of touch 
with the rest ofthe mechanism as to be spinning idly. 3 
Third, correspondence theorists utilize skyhooks, which would allow us to step outside 
our own language to see if the matching of language to world is adequate, if our language 
is fulfilling its representational role. As such, correspondence demands that finite 
speakers seek a 'God's-Eye' or Archimedean point of view where we stand inside and 
outside our language at the same time. 
Rorty charges the realists with failing to provide an independent test for the 
accuracy of representation. He argues that representationalists cannot devise a "test 
distinct from the success which is supposedly explained by this accuracy."4 Indeed, 
Davidson's antirepresentationalism has shown that we cannot identify 
in an instructive way ... what fact or slice of reality it is that makes a particular 
sentence true. No-one has succeeded in doing this. If we ask, for example, what 
makes the sentence 'the moon is a quarter million miles away' true, the only 
answer we come up with is that it is the fact that the moon is a quarter million 
miles away.5 
Realists cannot show us how correspondence offers a better explanation of true beliefs 
than the alternative pragmatic accounts of 'utility' or coping. Realism gives us no means 
to offer evidence contrary to the idea that a true beliefs utility is equivalent to "the utility 
of a fulcrum or a thumb [which] has nothing to do with the 'representing' or 
3 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," p. 141. 
4 Rorty, "Introduction: Antirepresentationalism, Ethnocentrism and Liberalism," p. 6. 
5 Donald Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," in Rorty and his Critics, ed. Robert B. Brandom (Malden, Mass.: 
Blackwell, 2000), p. 66. 
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'corresponding' to the weights lifted, or the object manipulated."6 Rorty simply applies 
the pragmatic principle that 'what makes no difference to practice should make no 
difference to theory' and in light of this principle he views the realist's notion of truth as 
seriously misguided. 
In denying the realist version of truth Rorty claims that he does not join rank with 
the idealists. The idealist position on truth would always succumb, according to this line 
of thought, to claims like Putnam's that "for any predicate P the idealist may want to 
substitute for 'true' one can find a statement S such that 'S might have property P and still 
not be true'."7 The idealist's theory of truth cannot show how any particular belief, which 
coheres with the mass, is itself true. Inferring that if we cannot make sense of truth as 
correspondence we must redefine it in terms of ideal coherence is an error - it does not 
lead us out of but back into the subject-object picture. Furthermore, in opting for truth as 
coherence amongst representations, idealists deny ontological heterogeneity. But how is a 
world of beliefs supposed to provide a bridge to a world ofnonbelief? In redefining 
reality, idealists, according to Rorty, wrongly redefined the object of knowledge. They 
confused the loss of the intrinsic nature of the world with the unreality of space and time; 
they mistakenly argued against commonsense that "human beings cause the 
spatiotemporal world to exist."8 
The idealist's denial of this reality and, conversely, the metaphysical realist's work 
of "transferring this nonlinguistic brutality to facts, to the truth of sentences"9 outline 
6 Rorty, "Introduction: Antirepresentationalism, Ethnocentrism and Liberalism," p. 6. 
7 Hilary Putnam, "Reference and Understanding," in Meaning and the Moral Sciences (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 108. 
8 Rorty, "The Contingency of Language," p. 4. 
9 Richard Rorty, "Texts and Lumps," in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume I 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991 ), p. 81. 
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inversely correlative difficulties. William James' pragmatism, according to Rorty, is 
decisive in thinking beyond these encumbrances. James defined truth as 'what it is good 
for us to believe' and argued that the truth "was not an analyzable relation at all, not a 
relation which could be clarified by ... [a] metaphysical description of the relation 
between beliefs and nonbeliefs." 10 He thought that we could get along fine with the 
notion of justification and debunked truth as only an expedient. James erred, according to 
Rorty, when he tried to give a positive account of truth as 'justified belief. This latter 
move is another form of the idealist error. We should not move from the failure to define 
truth within one relation to attempting to define it in terms of another. We have instead to 
make the negative move and forget the positive program; if we can do so then we can see 
pragmatism as consisting "simply in the dissolution of the traditional problematic about 
truth, as opposed to a constructive 'pragmatic theory of truth'." 11 
Rorty advocates a Wittgensteinian approach to determining the content of truth, 
and he wants us to consider the various uses of 'true' as indicating not a substantially 
unified concept but a much looser 'family resemblance'. Rorty claims we are better off 
talking about uses; we should consider "whether we have sorted out the various uses of 
the word 'true', decided which of them had better be discarded, and specified the 
functions performed by the remainder.'tl 2 According to Rorty, on truth the pragmatist can 
do no better than James. Yet James' negative account of truth has come to be seen as 
exceedingly narrow, allowing for an endorsing use of'true' but not for cautionary and 
disquotational uses. Davidson's linguistic theory (built into antirepresentationalism), 
10 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," p. 132. 
11 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," p. 127. 
12 Richard Rorty, "Response to Donald Davidson" in Rorty and his Critics, ed. Robert B. Brandom 
(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000), p. 77. 
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Rorty argues, allows us to develop an account of truth that can handle these uses while 
limiting truth to an expedient. 
Rorty argues that truth has an 'endorsing use'. We use the truth predicate to 
commend sentences that we find useful the same way we use cheers at a sporting event to 
express approval of winning players. Yet none of our predications or acclamations 
implicates a correspondence; each merely clarifies an "account of its approbative 
force." 13 
Truth also has a 'cautionary' use. This use can be seen in examples like "[y]our 
arguments satisfy all our contemporary norms and standards, and I can think of nothing 
to say against your claim, but still what you say might not be true." 14 Truth is cautionary 
in the sense that it can remind us that a sentence will not always 'pay its way', that there is 
no linguistic investment that is guaranteed to pay off. 
What philosophers can learn from Davidson's philosophy of language, according 
to Rorty, is that the predicate 'is true' has a disquotational use on top of these normative 
uses. Davidson's treatment of truth reveals that 
there is nothing more to be known about the relation between beliefs and the rest 
of reality than what we learn from an empirical study of causal transactions 
between organisms and their environment. The relevant result of this study is the 
field linguist's translation-cum-ethnographic-report. Since we already have (in 
dictionaries) a translation manual for ourselves, as well as (in encyclopedias) an 
auto-ethnography, there is nothing more for us to know about our relation to 
reality than we already know. There is no further job for philosoBhy to do. This is 
just what the pragmatist has been telling the skeptic all the time. 5 
Davidson's treatment, according to Rorty, imposes strict ethnocentric limits on truth and 
reinforces the above two normative uses. The best we can get is truth defined in a 
13 Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," p. 461. 
14 Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," p. 460. 
15 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," p. 135. 
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particular language L - defined without a central status or explanatory value. In light of 
disquotation's satisfaction relations, we should drop the idea that we are going to say 
something substantial about L's relation to reality. 
These three uses show us how far we can go with the notion of truth and still 
remain negative: 
Philosophers who, like myself, find ... Jamesian suggestions persuasive swing 
back and forth between trying to reduce truth to justification and propounding 
some form of minimalism about truth. In reductionist moods we have offered 
such definitions as 'warranted assertability' .... But such definitions always fall 
victim, sooner or later, to the argument that a given belief might meet any 
specifiable conditions, but still not be true. Faced with this ... we pragmatists have 
often fallen back on minimalism, and have suggested that Tarski's breezy 
disquotationalism may exhaust the topic of truth. 16 
Although Rorty closely relates truth and justification he avoids defining the 
former in terms of the latter. Rorty is not providing a raw substitution but applying the 
pragmatic razor. Debating the truth of a sentence or wondering whether it is adequately 
justified amounts to (much) the same thing; neither option informs my decision better 
than the other: 
If I have concrete, specific, doubts about whether one of my beliefs is true, I can 
only resolve those doubts by asking if it is adequately justified- by finding and 
assessing additional reasons pro and con. I cannot bypass justification and 
confine my attention to truth. 17 
There is no independent test to measure the truth of a sentence apart from our procedures 
of justification. The truth-justification distinction remains negative, it offers no definition 
but "an informal elucidation ofthe notion." 18 
16 Richard Rorty, "Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry? Davidson versus Wright," in The Philosophical Quarterly, 
no. 45, July 1995, p. 282. 
17 Rorty, "Epistemology and the Philosophy of Language," p. 281. 
18 Hilary Putnam, "Two Philosophical Perspectives," in Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 56. 
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The fall of representation, Rorty argues, relieves philosophers from the obligation 
of going beyond the community in seeking truth. All justifications are local and 
temporary. The cautionary use of truth reminds us that justification is relative to a system 
of belief. Justification is always presented in relation to a historically and culturally 
specific audience; 
the gap between justification and truth emerges when we find that even when we 
have satisfactorily justified a certain belief or sentence to the currently available 
audience, there can always be newer and more imaginative audiences to whom we 
still have to justify it. 19 
No justification is permanent or universal; there is no ideal audience to which 
justification would mean achieving the 'truth'. The rightness or wrongness of what we 
say, that is, what comments are warranted and unwarranted, is only for a specific time 
and a local place - truth as determined by an ethnocentric intra-theoretic standard. 
We have objectivity for us- objectivity humanly speaking. 
Antirepresentationalism, Rorty argues, has freed us from desiring metaphysical 
'objectivity'- the need to seek objective knowledge of a world that is so independent of 
us as to be indifferent to our descriptions and beliefs. As Hilary Putnam states: 
it can be objective that an interpretation or an explanation is the correct one, given 
the context and the interests which are relevant in the context. Something can be 
interest relative and objective humanly speaking ... [we] can recognize that there 
is a fact of the matter in interpretation without making that fact of the matter 
unique or context independent.20 
Warrant is usually determined objectively but this means only that it is justified 
according to the contingent social standards- it is usually an 'objective' matter as to 
19 Akeel Bilgrami, "Is Truth a Goal oflnquiry? Rorty and Davidson on Truth," in Rorty 
and His Critics, ed. Robert B. Brandom (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000), p. 245. 
20 Hilary Putnam, "Is There a Fact of the Matter about Fiction?" in Realism with a Human Face (Harvard: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 120. 
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"whether or not Sis warranted in asserting p as to whether or not she is over five feet 
tal1." 21 The 'fact of the matter' is no more than "our ability to figure out whether Sis in a 
good position, given the interests and values of herself and her peers, to assert p. "22 
Warrant or justification is, for Rorty, sociological not epistemological. 
Rorty offers the humanly tainted gloss able truth and tries to tum our attention to a 
"homely and shopworn sense of 'true' which Tarski and Davidson are attending to, "23 that 
is, a notion of truth connected with our practices, culture and form of life. Being openly 
and freely determined, Rorty's ethnocentric version of truth is something that we can 
"defend against all comers."24 
2.2 Disquotation, Meaning and Semantic Truth 
Rorty denies both the reality of a nonepistemic world and the possibility of 
constructing an objective relation to it (truth); but Davidson sees different consequences 
of antirepresentationalism for realism. Davidson's rejection of scheme-content dualism 
does not involve the rejection of objectivity and he takes issue when conceptual scheme 
theorists make truth 'immanent' and antirealists make truth innocuous. For Davidson, 
truth cannot be reduced to an intratheoretical notion for 
it is not easy to see how the same sentence (without indexical elements) ... can be 
true for one person and not for another, or for a given person at one time and not 
at another. .. it is hard to think in what language this position can be coherently, 
much less persuasively, expressed;25 
21 Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," p. 449. 
22 Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," p. 450. 
23 Rorty, "Epistemology and the Philosophy of Language," p. 308. 
24 Rorty, "Epistemology and the Philosophy of Language," p. 308. 
25 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 306. 
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nor can we do without it- "[t]ruth is one of the clearest and most basic concepts we have, 
so it is fruitless to dream of eliminating it."26 Davidson sees no reason why we should 
assume that the realist's radically non-epistemic or the antirealist's radically epistemic 
notions of truth "are the only ways to give substance to a theory of truth or meaning.'o27 In 
reestablishing objectivity Davidson has to provide an argument that language users 
generally get things right, that is, that belief is essentially veridical within the ubiquity of 
language; "[w)hat is needed to answer the skeptic is to show that someone with a (more 
or less) coherent set ofbeliefs has a reason to suppose his beliefs are not mistaken in the 
main."28 
Disquotation utilizes satisfaction, satisfaction's relations explain the "property of 
being true ... nontrivially, in terms of a relation between language and something else."29 
Davidson also notes that 
Tarski's satisfiers are infinite sequences which pair the variables of a language 
with the entities in its ontology ... but it turns out in the end that a closed sentence 
is true if and only if it is satisfied by some sequence. This may suggest that we 
have here the makings of a correspondence theory.30 
Yet, in satisfaction there is no correspondence because functions do not fulfill the role of 
facts. Sentential functions, according to Davidson, arbitrarily assign entities to variables 
and variables by their very definition "refer to no particular individua1."31 There is no 
fact, only the function satisfying the n place predicates; 
Thus 'Dolores loves Dagmar' would be satisfied by Dolores and Dagmar (in that 
order), provided Dolores loved Dagmar. I suppose Dolores and Dagmar (in that 
order) is not a fact either- the fact that 'Dolores loves Dagmar' should somehow 
include the loving. This 'somehow' has always been the nemesis of theories of 
26 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 314. 
27 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 309. 
28 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 126. 
29 Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 48. 
30 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 69. 
31 Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 48. 
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truth based on facts .... So the present point is not that 's is satisfied by all 
sentential functions' means exactly what we thought's corresponds to the facts' 
meant, only that the two phrases have this in common: both intend to express a 
relation between language and the world, and both are equivalent to 's is true' 
when s is a (closed) sentence. 32 
Unlike correspondence theory, in satisfaction each open sentence gets closed uniquely, is 
satisfied or is true because "different assignments of entities to variables satisfy different 
open sentences. "33 This means that truth is 
... reached ... by different routes for different reasons. All true sentences end up in 
the same place, but there are different stories about how they got there: a semantic 
theory of truth tells the story for a particular sentence by running through the steps 
of the recursive account of satisfaction appropriate to the sentence. 34 
The particular route to truth of an individual sentence can never be checked off against 
the world; the best we can manage is to check it off against the axioms from which it has 
been recursively generated. What satisfaction boils down to, then, is a relationship 
between language (sentential functions) and reality (objects) that provides unique routes 
for particular true sentences and is relative to language L. This is an unassuming 
correspondence in which we no longer compare truth-bearing linguistic vehicles with 
truth-making nonlinguistic entities. 
Davidson argues that satisfaction stories are not to be taken as a comprehensive 
account of truth; "the fact that satisfaction ... can be given an explicit definition ... should 
not lead us into thinking a general concept has been captured. "35 At best, satisfaction only 
explains truth relations within a theory. 
32 Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 48. 
33 Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 48. 
34 Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 49. 
35 Donald Davidson, "Reality without Reference," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984 ), p. 217. 
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Davidson aims to give a holistic account of the semantic relations between 
meaning, belief and truth that is fully causally relational and without reference to the 
uninterpreted content associated with conceptual schemes or realism's radically non-
epistemic model of correspondence. Sentences are close to meaning because they are 
truth-bearers; but, "sentences are not, as Quine made clear, independently meaningful in a 
sense richer than that ofbeing carriers of truth and falsehood. Sentences are meaningful 
only embedded in larger structure, a language."36 Davidson's holistic theory must "be able 
to specify ... what every sentence means ... our theory should equip us to say, for an 
arbitrary sentence, what the speaker of the language means by the sentence. "37 As we 
shall see, this requirement demands that an adequate semantic theory has to be finitely 
and semantically recursive. 
A semantic theory has to show how sentences of a language L are finitely 
recursive in order to explain how a language is learnable. Given a finite number of 
semantic primitives and the combinatorial devices inherent in the logic of grammar we 
are able to produce an infinite number of sentences. But this kind of recursion is 
insufficient to account for meaning in the face of a holism drawn as wide as Davidson's. 
Davidson sees his program, following Tarski's, as solving the central test of semantics -
"to give a semantic interpretation (the meaning) of every sentence in the language. "38 
Accordingly, a Tarskian definition via recursive satisfaction "provides an effective 
method for determining what every sentence means (i.e., gives the condition under which 
36 Ramberg, "Reference," p. 34. 
37 Donald Davidson, "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages," in Inquiries into Truth and 
Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 9. 
38 Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 22. 
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it is true)" 39 - it provides semantic recursion. A truth-functional account meets all the 
requirements for a meaning theory: 
Nothing stands in the way of putting what I am calling a theory of meaning into 
the form of an explicit definition of a predicate 'is T' ... The condition we have 
placed on satisfactory theories of meaning is in essence Tarski's Convention T 
that tests the adequacy of a formal semantic definition oftruth.40 
As Convention T gives the truth condition of every sentence for the foreign tongue 
"(relative to a sentence in the metalanguage), it determines the meaning of every word 
and sentence. This would seem to justify the title Theory ofMeaning."41 
Davidson asserts that a test of the meaning of a sentence in L would characterize, 
for every sentences ofL, an equivalent sentence p; in English: 's means p'. What can give 
the meaning of s? Translating homophonically (from within our own language) the only 
candidate is s itself and its finite recursion. But we should, Davidson argues, drop 
'meaning' and opt for an extensional explanation- "giving p a sentential connective and s 
its own truth predicate".42 The result is the T sentence "(T) sis T if and only ifp."43 On 
the left hand side ofthe T-sentence is the sentence's' ofthe object language and on the 
right hand side is the biconditional 'is true if, and only if and the sentence 'p' which states 
the truth condition - both in the metalanguage. This definition works because it gives 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of every sentence, and to give 
truth conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence. To know the 
semantic concept of truth for a language is to know what it is for a sentence- any 
sentence- to be true, and this amounts, in one good sense we can give to the 
phrase, to understanding the language. 44 
39 Davidson, "Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages," p. 8. 
40 Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 23. 
41 Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 24. 
42 Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 23. 
43 Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 23. 
44 Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 24. 
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Determining the truth-conditions of a speaker's sentences will produce a theory of truth 
that will allow us to understand the meaning of their utterances; "in point of meaning ... a 
word may be said to be determined to whatever extent the truth or falsehood of its 
contexts are determined. "45 Where Tarski studied formal languages Davidson adapts truth 
theory to deal with natural languages and the empirical context of interpretation. In 
constructing a truth theory for a foreign language we are interpreters; we come to deal 
with two sentences, that is, the sentences ofthe foreign tongue L to be interpreted and 
the fairly equivalent sentence pin the translator's native language. Tarski's theory makes 
it possible to construct a T -sentence for every true sentence 's' of the foreign language - in 
tum producing a truth theory for L. When given a sentence's' in, say German, we can 
generate the T -sentence "[t]he German sentence 'Schnee ist weiss' is true if and only if 
snow is white."46 As the T-sentence now expands over two sentences from two different 
languages interpretation gives us an extended disquotation. Because T -sentences allow 
the interpreter to identify the truth conditions of a sentences of the object language and 
provide an interpretation in the metalanguage, that is, sentence p, the interpreter, for all 
intents and purposes, knows the meaning of the sentences. Davidson calls the logic of 
Tarskian truth theories the deep grammar47 or structure of meaning. Tarski's truth theory 
allows Davidson to see an essential semantic relation between truth and meaning without 
appeal to epistemic intermediaries or 'content' type evidence. 
45 W.V.O. Quine, "Truth by Convention," in Ways of Paradox (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 82. 
46 Ian Hacking, "Donald Davidson's Truth," in Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 132. 
47 Donald Davidson, "Semantics for Natural Languages," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 61-63. 
49 
Davidson's adaptation of Tarski' s T -sentences to natural language incorporates 
indexical statements, i.e., sentences whose truth is dependent upon a speaker and a time. 
Davidson considers it obvious that sentences are not the vehicles of truth but, instead of 
rejecting a connection between truth and sentences, he asks us to consider "the time the 
sentence is uttered, and its utterer. "48 Thus considered 'truth' becomes a three place 
predicate; "[ w]e could take truth to be a property, not of sentences, but of utterances, or 
speech acts, or order triples of sentences, times and persons; but it is simplest just to view 
truth as a relation between a sentence, a person and a time. "49 Davidson's Tarskian style 
truth theory incorporates the indexical in the form: '(T) The sentences ofL is true for 
speaker u at timet if, and only if, p'. When T-sentences are given body through 
satisfaction we get examples like "'I am tired' is true as (potentially) spoken by p at t if 
and only ifp is tired at t'. 'That book is stolen' is true as (potentially) spoken by pat t if 
and only if the book demonstrated by pat tis stolen prior to t."50 Davidson's adjustment 
relates language with "the occasions oftruth"51 so as to provide a means to build a theory 
of truth for a natural language. 
Davidson's indexical sentences and Quine's observation/occasion sentences have 
parallel roles in constructing translation manuals and theories of interpretation, 
respectively. Indexical based sentences (just like in ostensive learning) "constitute the 
most direct link between language and the recurrent macroscopic objects of human 
48 Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 43. 
49 Donald Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), p. 34. 
50 Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 34. 
51 Davidson, "True to the Facts," p. 44. 
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interest and attention," 52 and they designate the literal meaning of utterances. An 
empirically based theory of truth must attend to such uses. 
Davidson argues that the construction of Tarskian style truth-theory demonstrates, 
in the context of actual empirical interpretation, that truth is a central concept in 
understanding a foreign speaker's linguistic behavior. Since T -sentences tell us under 
what conditions an utterance is true "a theory of truth is a theory for describing, 
explaining, understanding, and predicting a basic aspect of verbal behavior,"53 that is, 
meaning. Because of this centrality, Davidson holds 'truth' to be a crucial and important 
explanatory concept; semantic 
connections ... make truth the key to how the mind apprehends the world. Rorty 
doesn't mind much my saying that truth is one concept among a number of other 
related concepts which we use in describing, explaining, and predicting human 
behavior. But why, he asks, say truth is any more important than such concepts as 
intention, belief, desire, and so on? Importance is a hard thing to argue about. All 
these concepts (and more) are essential to thought, and cannot be reduced to 
anything simpler or more fundamental. Why be niggardly in awarding prizes; I'm 
happy to hand out the golden apples all round.54 
Antirealists argue that 'truth-in-L' can never approach the level of objectivity 
realism requires because such disquotable characterizations always remain inside the 
ethnocentric limit. The disquotational use of truth takes the truth predicate to be as 
repetitively shallow as "to say metalinguistic things ofthe form'S' is true iff -----,"55 
where the'-----' is filled in by the self same sentenceS originally on the left side of the 
biconditional. We disquote by constructing a T -sentence and dropping what was exterior 
to the quotations on the left side of the biconditional and moving it over to the right side; 
52 Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 35. 
53 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 313. 
54 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 73. 
55 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," p. 128. 
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thus, 'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white. For a sentence to be true is for it 
to merely 
be disquotable- is for it to be correctly usable to make a claim just because ... , 
where in the gap we insert, not quoted but used, the sentence that figures on the 
right hand side of the T -sentence provided for the sentence in question by a good 
Tarskian theory for its language (the sentence itself, in the case in which we can 
exploit the unextended idea of disquotation).56 
The disquotational use denies that truth is a substantive property and sees it as "just 
another way of asserting the sentence. "57 It negates any substantial language to world 
connection while reaffirming the conventional (glossable) notion of truth- it is used "just 
to reaffirm the platitudes that all men are mortal and that sugar is soluble. "58 
According to Rorty, the totality of these disquotable T-sentences produces "an 
infinite axiomatization of the concept of truth ... while exhaust[ing] the content of the 
concept."59 Ifwe wonder about 'truth' in general all we can do is, using Tarski, define 
'true-in-L'- define it within the theory. Using T-sentences we never approach any 
explanation ofthe truth theory; we never capture the intuitive content of the notion of 
truth. Disquotation conforms to Rorty's negative attitude towards truth as no significant 
role is given to it nor is it positively defined. For Rorty, 
[w]e understand all there is to know about the relation ofbeliefs to the world 
when we understand their causal relations with the world; our knowledge of how 
to apply terms such as 'about' and 'true of fallout from a naturalistic account of 
linguistic behavior. 60 
56 John McDowell, "Toward Rehabilitating Objectivity," in Rorty and His Critics, ed. Robert B. Brandom 
(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000), p. 116. 
57 Putnam, "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," p. 331. 
58 Hilary Putnam, "Does the Disquotational Theory of Truth Solve All Philosophical Problems?" in Words 
and Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 265. 
59 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 68. 
60 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," p. 128. 
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When the linguist uses T -sentences and satisfaction to construct a truth theory for a 
foreign tongue, he produces, according to Rorty, trivial accounts of the application of 
truth predicates for language L; since these accounts are always couched in our 
metalanguage his "translation-cum-ethnographic-report ... [shows that] there is nothing 
more for us to know about our relation to reality than we already know."61 Davidson's 
turn to semantics within the new causal picture of language demystifies the language to 
world connection by 
saying that if we have causal relations ... holding between the World and the Self, 
as well as relations of justification ('being a reason for') internal to the selfs 
network of beliefs and desires, we do not need any further relations to explain 
how the Self gets in touch with the World ... 62 
In disquotation the relation between language and reality for L neither supports 
objectivity nor realism. 
Davidson denies that Tarskian truth theories demonstrate a fully trivial limit to 
truth. T-sentences, accordingly, show what language can express. Tarskian truth-theory 
seeks the totality of sentences which "exhausts the extension of the truth predicate for a 
particular language ... and each such sentence does tell us exactly under what conditions 
the quoted sentence is true" 63 in L. Indeed, Rorty allows that Tarskian truth-theory can 
define the application of the truth predicate for a given language; such a definition may 
be "the only way, to exhibit a natural language as a learnable, recursive structure, and 
thus give a systematic theory of meaning for a language."64 The pragmatist denies that 
61 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," p. 135. 
62 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," p. 120. 
63 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 69. 
64 Rorty, "Introduction: Pragmatism and Philosophy," p. xxvi. 
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such a truth theory tells us something substantial about the relations between the 
sentences of the metalanguage and the world. 
Disquotation is used to deny the distinction between sentences with truth 
conditions (a realist notion) and sentences with assertability conditions, viewing the 
former as empty. Attributing objectivity to Tarskian truth theory is an attempt to make up 
for "what Tarski failed to do ... to show us how to detect in nature the pattern his truth-
theories for specific languages exhibit." 65 Tarski showed "in detail how to describe the 
kind of pattern truth must make, whether in language or in thought. What we need to do 
now is to say how to identify the presence of such a pattern or structure in the behavior of 
people"66 for successful interpretation. Rorty argues that a Tarskian theory which tracks 
the pattern of truth only determines the truth-conditions for sentences relative to the way 
we speak- it produces a theory of our complex behavior. We have no need to define 
general patterns of linguistic behavior because "[t]he pattern truth makes is, in fact, 
indistinguishable from that pattern that justification to us makes. "67 
Recognition of disquotation, Rorty argues, is the last step in dissolving the 
traditional problematic about truth; it helps us see that "all the classical problems of 
philosophy, at least from the time ofDescartes, are 'optional' ... [T]he general name ofthe 
problem of 'representation' is precisely the problem of the nature of truth. "68 From the 
antirealist perspective disquotation is a wonderful tool because 
it brings with it no large claims about the 'representational' nature of thought and 
language, and therefore no claims to how truth is a form of 'correspondence' to the 
65 Rorty, "Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry? Davidson versus Wright," p. 287 
66 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 295. 
67 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 287. 
68 Hilary Putnam, "On Truth," in Words and Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 
316. 
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world. The role of truth is justified only in feeding into our grasp of a subject's 
b h . 69 e avwr .... 
Accordingly, Tarskian truth theory does not promote realism. 
Is Davidson's use of Tarskian truth-theories merely disquotational? Davidson 
avidly denies such: "I am not tempted to refer to Tarski's truth definitions as 
'disquotational'."70 Davidson objects to disquotation's separation oftruth and meaning; if 
Tarskian truth-theories are taken to be tools that simply erase the truth predicate, then the 
meaning of one's sentences can only be calibrated ethnocentrically. Instead of truth 
conditions to account for the meaning of an utterance we fall back on conventionalist 
theories that define meaning in terms of use. But we have seen that a disquotational 
approach to Tarski falls short on the semantic relation between truth and meaning when 
we "interpret his formal systems as empirical theories about languages."71 The semantic 
relationship demonstrates that "Tarski's work [taken disquotationally] is largely unrelated 
to the concept of truth as we commonly understand it, so that, if we want to study the 
semantics of interpreted languages ... we must take another tack."72 
The extended and unextended senses of disquotation are difficult to reconcile. 
Disquotation works properly only in the case where the metalanguage has absorbed the 
object language and breaks down in the empirical context of interpretation. Once 
disquotation is extended " [ o ]ne cannot find an English equivalent of the English sentence 
"'Schnee ist weiss' is true (in German)'' simply by removing the quotation marks from 
'Schnee ist weiss'. ,,73 This indicates that Tarski's truth theories are not disquotational for 
69 Bilgrami, "Is Truth a Goal oflnquiry?: Rorty and Davidson on Truth," p. 244. 
70 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 283. 
71 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 294. 
72 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 294. 
73 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 285. 
55 
they "do not depend on stripping the quotation marks from individual sentences in order 
to eliminate truth predicates. Still less do they depend on using the actual sentences said 
to be true to effect the elimination."74 
Davidson argues that disquotation does not give the complete content of the 
concept of truth; such content escapes the ethnocentric limit because "neither object 
language nor metalanguage can contain its own truth predicate." 75 If we look for the truth 
conditions of a truth-predicated sentence we are no longer using the predicate in the 
disquotational mode. In homophonic translation 
[ w ]hen I say that the sentence 'Snow is White' is true, I am accepting my own 
language, or, in a Tarskian reconstruction, the part of it I take as the 
metalanguage, as a given ... I am taking 'Snow is white' in the metalanguage to be 
a translation of'Snow is white' in the object language (I am taking 'snow is white' 
at face value). This enables me to accept 'Snow is white' is true if and only if 
snow is white. But how can I ever decide that snow is white?76 
'True in L' does not tell us why such a predicate is (actually) true; nevertheless, Davidson 
argues, non-disquotational truth is something we know implicitly when we understand 
that ""'snow is white' is true' if and only if snow is white' is correct in a way that "'snow is 
white' is true' if and only if grass is green' is not." 77 Tarskian truth theory assumes a prior 
grasp of the concept of truth and then shows how it is manifested in L. Disquotation 
excludes the general concept when it characterizes 'true-in-L'; Tarski "failed to define a 
predicate of the form's is true in L' for variable 'L'."78 There is more to truth because 
there is no indication in Tarski's work what his various truth predicates have in 
common, and this must be part of the content of the concept. It is not enough to 
point to Convention-T as that indication, for it does not speak to the question of 
how we know that a theory of truth for a language is correct. The concept of truth 
74 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 285. 
75 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 69. 
76 Putnam, "A Comparison of Something with Something Else," p. 339. 
77 Davidson, "Truth and Meaning," p. 25. 
78 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 285. 
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has essential connections with the concepts of belief and meaning ... It is here that 
we should expect to uncover what we miss in Tarski's characterizations .... 79 
2.3 Radical Interpretation, Charity and Veridical Belief 
Although Rorty has challenged that it is impossible to fill in the content of truth 
without falling into the metaphysics of the subject-object picture, Davidson takes the 
position of the field linguist in order to answer the question 'What is it for a sentence to 
be true?' In this context the question becomes "how is 'true' used by the outside observer 
of the language game?"80 Interpretation is needed both in understanding one's own 
language from the inside (homophonically) and from the outside in trying to understand 
an alien tongue (heterophonicially): 
[t]he problem of interpretation is domestic as well as foreign: it surfaces for 
speakers of the same language in the form ofthe question, how can it be 
determined that the language is the same? Speakers of the same language can go 
on the assumption that for them the same expressions are to be interpreted in the 
same way ... All understanding of speech involves radical interpretation. But it 
will help keep assumptions from going unnoticed to focus on cases where 
interpretation is most clearly called for: interpretation in one idiom of talk into 
another.81 
Translation deals with the syntactical relation of two languages where "what is wanted is 
an interpretation of one (in another, of course, but that goes without saying since any 
theory is in some language)."82 In the case ofheterophonic translation, the translator 
brings to the translation more than what is required for translation's mere syntactical 
equivalency (Quine's model). Understanding a foreign sentence, Davidson argues, 
79 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 295. 
80 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," p. 134. 
81 Donald Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1984), p. 126. 
82 Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," p. 129. 
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involves constructing a truth theory for the foreign tongue via radical interpretation. 
Homophonic translation is to be understood in a semantically derivative fashion. 
The field linguist must keep in mind that truth is a three-place predicate, that truth 
theories deal with true sentential utterances and that interpretation is tied to the 
observable via assent, dissent and observation/demonstrative sentences. An utterance has 
the truth conditions (meaning) that the speaker intends it to have. Speakers who wish to 
be understood intend to be interpreted in a certain way, and successful interpretation 
requires that "the actual interpretation of the speaker's words [proceeds] along the 
intended lines through the interpreter's recognition ofthe speaker's intention."83 In order 
to communicate we interpret a speaker as he intends to be understood, we uncover his 
literal meanings. Communication does not necessarily require the same language but it 
does require a fit between 
how speakers intend to be interpreted and how their interpreters understand them. 
This demand no doubt tends to encourage convergence in speech behavior among 
those who exchange words, the degree depending on factors like shared social and 
economic status, education and ethnic background, etc.84 
The idea is that speakers who manage to establish a balance with their interpreters 
between how they want to be understood and how they are understood have secured 
theories of interpretation so as to convey what their sentences mean. The interpreter 
travels in a circle because meaning is 
dependent upon the empirical confirmation ... which interrelates literal meanings 
and propositional attitudes in the context of an ongoing construction of the 
complete web of sentences which constitute the language ... [Via the interpretive 
method,] individualized reference becomes irrelevant to the holistic context of 
language behavior. 85 
83 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 311. 
84 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 311. 
85 A.C. Genova, "The Very Idea of Massive Truth," in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Lewis 
Edwin Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), p. 169. 
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In developing T -sentences the field linguist tries on different interpretations until he 
strikes equilibrium and is able to craft a passing theory. It is through these passing 
theories that the linguist holistically establishes an interpretation and determines the 
reference of individual terms. 
The field linguist is oriented initially to the observable; "the key observables are 
acts of assent and dissent, as caused by events within the gambit of the speaker. "86 
Speech acts provide a way to account for how the "linguistic is aligned with non-
linguistic behavior in the course ofthe native's interaction with his environment."87 The 
interpreter has to "look for the best way to fit our logic, to the extent required to get a 
theory satisfying Convention T, on to the new language ... treating this much logic as a 
grid to be fitted onto the language in one fell swoop. "88 Basically, we apply the rules and 
conventions of our language to the foreign tongue so as to begin to develop a means of 
comparison. We work, at this level, with "classes of sentences always held true or always 
held false by almost everyone almost all of the time (potential logical truths) and patterns 
of inference. "89 At this point, we are trying to identify sentences with consistent truth-
values. The interpreter then attempts to identify the truth conditions of indexical 
sentences, that is, those sentences whose truth-value changes in relation to changes in the 
environment. At this stage we are still trying to pin down the applicability of the truth 
predicate for L; these two steps limit the number of possible interpretations. Finally, the 
interpreter attempts to identify sentences whose truth-value is debatable, "not depend[ent] 
86 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 318. 
87 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," p. 133. 
88 Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," p. 136. 
89 Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," p. 136. 
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systematically upon changes in the environment. "90 Such sentences are generally more 
theoretical than practical and are not members of what we might call our 'core beliefs'. 
Alone, these steps are not sufficient to constitute an act of interpretation. The 
interpreter must also practice charity; he "approaches the data armed with the regulative 
principle that most of the native's rules are the same as ours, which is to say that most of 
them are true. "91 Davidson borrows the notion of charity from Quine; charity reveals the 
semantic structure necessary for communication: 
correct interpretation of an agent by another cannot intelligibly admit certain 
kinds and degrees of difference between interpreter and interpreted with respect to 
belief. As a result, an interpreter is justified in making certain assumptions about 
the beliefs of an agent before an interpretation begins.92 
Charity is the key to radical translation; it is "a condition of having a workable theory, it 
is meaningless to suggest that we might fall into massive error by endorsing it. "93 Charity 
maximizes agreement and advances on two fronts by way of semantic charity and 
epistemic charity. 
Semantic charity (or the 'Principle of Coherence') involves two steps. Charity has 
at its base the idea that assent reflects logic - "an interpreter cannot accept great or 
obvious deviations from his own standards of rationality without destroying the 
foundation of intelligibility on which all interpretation rests."94 We cannot understand 
highly irrational speakers; thus, as a condition of interpretation, a "rational pattern ... 
must ... be shared by all rational creatures."95 Interpreter and interpretee need to agree to 
more than logic. In order to interpret the meaning of another's utterances we must assume 
90 Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," p. 136. 
91 Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth," p. 133. 
92 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 319. 
93 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 197. 
94 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 320. 
95 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 320. 
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that the speaker holds her beliefs to be true. Only true beliefs provide a measure for 
assent; a "speaker who wishes his words to be understood cannot systematically deceive 
his would-be interpreters about when he assents to sentences - that is, holds them true. "96 
Semantic charity is not enough. The interpreter's goal is to understand what the 
speaker means by a sentence and we know that this involves a measure of what she 
believes; "if we merely know that someone holds a certain sentence to be true, we know 
neither what he means by the sentence nor what belief his holding true represents. ,.n The 
interpreter's problem is a 'vector of two forces': 
what he is assumed to know - the causes of assents to sentences of a speaker -
is ... the product of two things that he is assumed not to know, meaning and belief. 
If he knew the meanings he would know the beliefs, and if he knew the beliefs 
expressed by sentences assented to, he would know the meanings. But how can he 
learn both at once, since each depends on the other?98 
The theory of interpretation has to allow the interpreter to develop a theory of meaning 
and a theory of belief at the same time- a method that allows us to determine one while 
cornering the other. The solution is found in "the attitude of holding a sentence to be 
true ... [for it] relates belief and interpretation in a fundamental way."99 'Holding a belief 
to be true' in the context of an interpretive strategy provides the interpreter with a means 
to "make a correct attribution ofbelief." 100 The interpreter has to apply 'epistemic charity' 
(or the 'Principle of Correspondence') to semantic agreement while respecting the 
ubiquity of language; given the latter, the only "unimpeachable ... method available to the 
interpreter automatically puts the speaker's belief in accord with the standards ... of the 
96 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 129. 
97 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 196. 
98 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 129. 
99 Davidson, "Thought and Talk," p. 162. 
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interpreter, and hence credits the speaker with the plain truths." 101 Epistemic charity 
directs the interpreter to translate via "his own standards of truth into the pattern of truth 
held true by the speaker." 102 We assume that the speaker not only holds true beliefs but 
also that those beliefs are in fact true, as we judge them. This makes the interpreter's and 
the speaker's beliefs equivalent and provides a "common ground on which to judge either 
conformity or difference" 103 ofbelief. 
Semantic and epistemic charity combine to form Davidson's maximizing 
agreement thesis; communication is possible only in as far as speakers are engaged in a 
manner that optimizes agreement. Maximized agreement gives us a measure for the 
viability of a subject for interpretation; if we cannot attribute logic or rationality to 
speakers, nor take them to be holding true beliefs, nor consider them as having a "set of 
beliefs largely consistent and true by our own standards, we have no reason to count that 
creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as saying anything." 104 
We bring to the scene of an interpretation a prior truth theory and begin to 
construct a passing truth theory; 
For the hearer, the prior theory expresses how he is prepared to interpret an 
utterance of the speaker, while the passing theory is how he does interpret the 
utterance. For the speaker, the prior theory is what he believes the interpreter's 
prior theory to be, while his passing theory is the theory he intends the interpreter 
to use. 105 
Prior theories are complex theories of human linguistic behavior, involving the meanings, 
desires and behaviors expected by the interpreter to be expressed by the interpretee. In 
101 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 130. 
102 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 129. 
103 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 129. 
104 Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," p. 137. 
105 Donald Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," in Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the 
Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernest Lepore (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 442. 
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the homophonic setting we often already know the truth conditions of another's 
utterances (and hence the meaning of those utterances), yet communication in our own 
language is not always so easy and difficulties interpreting may arise because we may 
make mistakes or use words differently. If a speaker makes a mistake we can opt for 
reinterpreting these utterances so as to foster communication instead of ending it; we 
may, e.g., think the speaker is using a word in a novel way. We reinterpret in order to 
"preserve a reasonable theory ofbeliefd06 and, in doing so, we blaze a passing theory. 
Charity makes meaningful agreement and disagreement possible; disagreement 
depends entirely on a foundation - some foundation - in agreement. The 
agreement may take the form of a widespread sharing of sentences held true by 
speakers of'the same language', or agreement in the large mediated by a theory of 
truth contrived by an interpreter. 107 
Too much error blurs the focus of disagreement in conversation. Specific error, Davidson 
argues, gives belief its point; "the more sentences we conspire to accept or reject 
(whether or not through a medium of interpretation), the better we understand the rest, 
whether or not we agree about them." 108 We have no understanding ofhow we could 
communicate with a speaker who was mostly wrong about what there is, so we must 
'count him true in most matters'; "it must generally be the case that a sentence is true 
when a speaker holds it to be true." 109 
Charity provides the ground for the massive truthfulness of belief. The veridical 
nature ofbelieflies in the conditions of interpretation that make another's speech 
intelligible; "[w]hat makes interpretation possible, then, is that we can dismiss a priori the 
106 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, " p. 196. 
107 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 196. 
108 Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," p. 137. 
109 Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," p. 169. 
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chance of massive error." 110 With this argument for the objectivity of truth, Davidson can 
dismiss the skeptic. The investigation into the conditions of communication has revealed 
two kinds of truth: one homely and shopworn 'true-in-L', the other objective or, as 
Davidson refers to it, "absolutely basic." 111 Absolute truth is presupposed by 
communication and interpretation; absolute truth is held constant between languages and 
cannot be relativized to a language. 112 Absolute truth is, according to Davidson, the most 
basic concept we have and remains indefinable. Indefinability is 
what we should expect. For the most part, the concepts philosophers single out for 
attention, like truth, knowledge, belief. .. are the most elementary concepts we 
have, concepts without which (I am inclined to say) we would have no concepts at 
all. Why then should we expect to be able to reduce these concepts to other 
concepts that are simpler, clearer, and more basic? We should accept the fact that 
what makes these concepts so important must also foreclose on the possibility of 
finding a foundation for them which reaches deeper into the bedrock. 113 
Absolute truth, not reference, is basic to an empirical theory oflanguage. Within a truth-
theory we characterize truth for another language by developing T -sentences that state the 
truth conditions for particular sentences. Additionally, we explain these particular 
sentences' relation to reality via the concept of satisfaction, which assists us in 
understanding as true the utterances of the foreign speaker in language L but "assigns no 
empirical content directly to relations between names or predicates and objects. These 
relations are given content indirectly when the T -sentences are." 114 When it comes to 
interpreting the theory as a whole, that is, explaining why the truth-theory we have 
developed for another language holds, we can only give it empirical application via 
110 Davidson, "Radical Interpretation," pp. 168-169. 
111 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 285. 
112 Bjorn Ramberg, "Radical Interpretation (1): The Principle of Charity," in Donald Davidson's 
Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), p. 76. 
113 Donald Davidson, "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth," in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. XC/11, no. 
6, June 1996, p. 264. 
114 Davidson, "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth," p. 223. 
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nonlinguistic evidence. The evidence for a theory of truth for a language as a whole 
"cannot be described in terms that relate it in advance to any particular language, and this 
suggest that the concept to which we appeal has a generality that the theory cannot hope 
to explain." 115 
Is a priori massive truth enough to establish the veridical nature of belief? Why 
are these shared beliefs, in fact, true of the world? Davidson appears to be arguing that 
'agreement establishes truth' but all interpretation can show is agreement between 
speakers and sentences held true. This ensures intersubjective agreement but it is not 
enough to confirm the claim that beliefs are, in fact, veridical. Davidson's argument, in 
staying with coherence and a priori evidence, appears to tum on a "purely conceptual, 
self evident connection between the concepts and truth" 116 and not on a language to world 
relation - a connection reminiscent of a Kantian-type transcendental deduction. Is 
Davidson substituting agreement for objectivity? How does coherence yield 
correspondence? 
Belief is veridical, Davidson argues, because the world determines the contents of 
belief; the world "must already be there ... as a condition for counting speech as 
meaningful, as more than a stream of noise." 117 What we say of the world, the utterances 
revealing the beliefs we hold, is largely correct in relation to the external world that 
causes beliefs to be what they are. Quine maintained a proximal theory relating the 
meaning of utterances to the world via observation sentences' 'stimulus meaning' -
115 Davidson, "Reality without Reference," p. 223. 
116 Genova, "The Very Idea ofMassive Truth," p. 174. 
117 Frank Farrell, "Davidson and the Disenchantment of Language," in Subjectivity, Realism and 
Postmodemism: The Recovery of the World (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 78. 
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meaning was tied to the internal causal relations of the senses. Davidson's argues to the 
contrary that 
the details of the mechanisms that constitute the causal chains from speaker to 
speaker, and spoken-of object to speaker and language learner, cannot matter to 
meaning and reference. The grasp of meanings is determined only by the terminal 
elements in the conditioning process and is tested only by the end product: use of 
words geared to appropriate objects and situations .... [T]wo speakers who mean 
'the same thing' by an expression need have no more in common than their 
dispositions to appropriate verbal behavior; the neural networks may be very 
different ... The causal connection between thought and objects and events in the 
world could have been established in entirely different ways without making any 
difference to the contents or veridicality ofbelief. 118 
Davidson prefers Quine's less developed distal theory. The distal theory holds that the 
contents of belief are correctly about that which caused them- 'the terminal elements', 
that is, events and objects distant or 'out there' separate from the trappings of our sensory 
systems. The distal theory drops the notion of an epistemological step "from central 
theoretical importance to meaning and knowledge." 119 It is the truth-conditions or "causes 
external to the speaker [that] matter directly to meaning," 120 especially the fixed points 
between all speakers. The shared stimulus is the "world. The shared stimulus is, of 
course, distal. The unshareable stimulations ofthe sense organs are not fixed points." 121 
The distal theory emphasizes that which is salient between speakers and interpreters - the 
similarity of their linguistic responses (assent behavior) in relation to objects in their 
shared environment. As Davidson states, the evidence for "'That is snow' is based on the 
causal connection between a speaker's assent to the sentence and the demonstrative 
presentation of snow." 122 Meaning requires a causal picture, semantics depends on 
118 Davidson, "The Myth of the Subjective," pp. 301-303. 
119 Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," p. 76. 
120 Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," p. 77. 
121 Davidson, "Meaning, Truth and Evidence," p. 76. 
122 Donald Davidson, "Seeing Through Language," in Thought and Language, ed. J. M. Preston 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 26, note 11. 
66 
external circumstances; "[c]ommunication begins where causes converge: your utterance 
means what mine does ifbeliefin its truth is systematically caused by the same events 
and objects." 123 The causal picture acts as a guide for the interpreter, who works in the 
context of charity such that it is impossible to identify meaning apart from beliefs and the 
causes of beliefs. When we look for a 'true belief in others we are recognizing something 
we all share as language users. 
Truth in our language, according to Davidson, is the same as it is in others; truth 
is objective as a result of the causal/semantic connections between meaning, belief and 
truth. Accordingly, we can call Davidson's position a 'semantic realism'. It posits a 
transcendental relation between the linguistic and nonlinguistic realms, a relation that 
escapes proper characterization in any particular language because it can only be 
articulated in language as 'true-in-L'. Since an interpreter practicing charity imposes 
standards of truth, this position suggests an antirealist characterization of truth but the 
interpreter only imposes standards in light ofthe universal applicability of truth to any 
language. Truth is objective because belief is veridical; true beliefs require only a causal 
relation between "what the words as spoken mean, and how the world is arranged." 124 
Because speakers share this common world they can have a basis on which to agree and 
disagree. Truth does escape limits of the disquotation; Davidson's philosophy of language 
salvages a notion of truth that is nontrivial and applies to languages generally. In 
explicating truth's role as an intersubjective standard Davidson formulates how we can 
understand speakers as communicating agents in a shared environment - he produces a 
model that has no problematic distinction between the linguistic and the empirical. 
123 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 132. 
124 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 122. 
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Davidson, unlike Rorty, is not eager to give up on a substantial, albeit oblique or 'mild'125, 
relation between language and world. 
2.4 Externalism, Triangulation and Thought 
The causal-semantic model correlates to the naturalized view oflanguage 
learning; together, these models further outline the essential role truth plays in 
language. 126 A comprehensive account ofmeaning (and therefore oftruth) "can best be 
made by appealing to obvious facts about language learning and to facts about how we 
interpret words and languages with which we are unfamiliar." 127 
We are unable to share the same physical space; therefore "each of us has his own 
perspective on it. .. [but] the relations among our positions are intelligible because we 
locate each person in a single, common world." 128 A triangle is formed between 
ourselves, others and the world. In its basic form the triangle requires at least two 
organisms whose reactions are causally connected to their environment and correlated 
with each other. Triangulation occurs in natural populations of organisms and has a 
physiological-sociological basis; it is 'wired in' so to speak, and, "[o]ne sees this in its 
simplest form in a school of fish, where each fish reacts almost instantaneously to the 
motions ofthe others." 129 Most organisms exhibit triangulated activities but not all of 
125 Don Ross, "Rainforest Realism," in Dennett's Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, eds. Andrew 
Brook et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), p. 159. 
126 Davidson more or less accepts Quine's 'ostension to mastery' account of how a person learns to speak a 
language and appreciates the value of the double role Quine assigns to observations sentences. 
127 Davidson, "The Myth of the Subjective," p. 302. 
128 Davidson, "The Myth of the Subjective," p. 296. 
129 Donald Davidson, "The Emergence of Thought," in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 128. 
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them exhibit thought or speech. According to Davidson, "[ o ]ur sense of objectivity is 
... another sort oftriangulation."130 
In the initial stages of language learning we cannot say that a child's simple 
utterance exhibits thought or speech. At first, in language learning, ostension is pure 
conditioning. The learning process begins merely with an association "between object or 
situation and sound and gesture. The value of the association is supplied by the teacher or 
the environment in the form of reward. In the beginning there is not a word but a sound 
being given a use." 131 At the start the child shows no more cognizance than an animal in 
training; "error has no point ... for there is nothing [for the child] to be wrong about, and 
where error has no point, there is not a concept or thought." 132 The interaction between 
teacher and student creates a space for success and failure, the necessary condition for the 
emergence of language and 'propositional thought'. 
Language is an inherently social medium of interaction and truth will have its 
basis in the interpersonal relationships we share; "we could not have the concept of 
getting things right or wrong if it were not for our interactions with other people." 133 
Given our shared modes of generalization and language tutelage, the space for success or 
failure is opened slowly as the child moves from conditioning, to imitation and to 
correlation. When the child correlates its responses with another's responses it has entered 
the social fray. Early speakers seek repeated one-word sentences, group them together 
and tie these utterances to the objects in the world. Correlation allows each creature to 
130 Donald Davidson, "Rational Animals," in Actions and Events, eds. Ernest Lepore and Brian 
McLaughlin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 480. 
131 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 71. 
132 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 71. 
133 Davidson, "The Emergence of Thought," p. 129. 
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come to "expect the external phenomena when it perceives the associated reaction of the 
other.',J 34 Social interaction accounts for how experience gives our thoughts specific 
content; without shared responses to mutually salient objects and events we have no 
measure to gauge what we or others are reacting to- "[i]t takes two points of view to give 
a location to the cause ofthought, and thus to define its content." 135 Because content is 
determined in the process of triangulation, the child who eventually learns the meaning of 
the word 'red' learns not just something about the English language but also something 
about the world which English speakers (and others) inhabit. 
without language, Davidson argues, "the base line of the triangle, the line between 
the two agents ... [cannot be] strengthened to the point where it can implement the 
communication of propositional contents." 136 Sentences are understood if the speaker 
understands the propositional contents the sentences express. Those propositional 
contents (or concepts) classify objects, their properties and events involving those 
objects. Children, Davidson states, can only come to understand the concepts used in 
their sentences if they can recognize the differences laid out by the concepts themselves: 
we can only say the child thinks something is red, or a ball, if it appreciates the 
distinction ... [T]he child thinks something is red, or a ball only if it is in some 
sense aware that a mistake is ~ossible. It is classifying things, and it may have put 
something in the wrong slot. 1 7 
Belief is possible only if one understands that belief can be correct or incorrect; "I 
can believe it is now raining, but this is because I know that whether or not it is raining 
does not depend on whether I believe it, or anyone believes it, or it is useful to believe it; 
134 Davidson, "The Emergence of Thought," p. 129. 
135 Donald Davidson, "Three Varieties of Knowledge," in Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 212. 
136 Davidson, "The Emergence of Thought," p. 130. 
137 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 71. 
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. . . h . h' fth h "138 1t 1s up to nature, not to me or my soc1ety or t e entue 1story o e uman race. 
Behavior may indicate a change in environment "but if the anticipated danger or 
opportunity fails to materialize, a place exists for the notion of a mistake." 139 
Communicating organisms must be in a position to notice error on behalf of their 
communicating counterpart; if one of them can recognize error then one has "grasped the 
concept of objective truth." 140 Beliefis a condition ofknowledge and to believe a 
sentence we have to know what it is for such a sentence to be true; we require, thus, the 
concept of objective truth. Anyone "who has a belief about the world - or anything else -
must grasp ... what is the case independent ofwhat he or she thinks." 141 The concept of 
objective truth entails understanding that one's beliefs "may or may not jibe with 
reality." 142 Truth, Davidson states, is primordial (absolutely basic): "[w]ithout a grasp of 
the concept of truth, not only language, but thought itself, is impossible." 143 
Communication is the only measure for the correct use of words; only language 
provides the base line for interpretation and a standard of objectivity. Only if a creature 
has such a standard can we attribute to it possession of the concept of truth and think of it 
as having thoughts. Triangulation is necessary as the "ultimate source ofboth objectivity 
and communication ... by relating speaker, interpreter and the world, [it] determines the 
contents of thought and speech." 144 Triangulation anchors language to the world; it 
"guarantees the general correctness of a limited body of belief, but the beliefs in this 
category carry great weight, for they ensure that there is a world external to us that 
138 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 72. 
139 Davidson, "Seeing Through Language," p. 27. 
140 Davidson, "Seeing Through Language," p. 27. 
141 Davidson, "Three Varieties of Knowledge," p. 209. 
142 Davidson, "The Emergence of Thought," p. 133. 
143 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 72. 
144 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 325. 
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contains people and a considerable number of other macroscopic objects, and that these 
objects exist independent ofus in a shared time and space." 145 
Davidson has found a way to make explicit what disquotation could only indicate. 
Truth lets us know what it is for sentences in our own language to be true; truth is 
articulated as true-in-L but truth is also something presupposed by all language users. 
Truth underlies our attempts at forming theories of complex behavior used as a means to 
interpret the speech of others. Furthermore, the concept of truth is the prime condition of 
meaningful speech and gives one an understanding of what true beliefs are and what it 
means for a thinker to hold true beliefs; the concept provides the context for 
understanding how belief, thought and language interact. While truth is not a vehicle to 
accurate representations it can still operate as a central explanatory concept. 
Davidson's analysis places much weight on truth but does very little to clarify its 
nature. This is unproblematic, however, as the nature of truth is not "amenable to sharp 
formulation in a clearer, more basic, vocabulary." 146 We cannot define truth in isolation 
from the other notions; it is not the case that "we can say nothing revealing about it: we 
can, by relating it to other concepts like belief, desire, cause, and action. Nor does the 
indefinability of truth imply that the concept is mysterious, ambiguous, or 
untrustworthy." 147 When it comes to these semantic concepts we cannot "produce correct 
and revealing definitions ... in terms of clearer or even more fundamental concepts." 148 
145 Donald Davidson, "Reply to A. C. Genova," in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Lewis Edwin 
Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), p. 193. 
146 Davidson, "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth," p. 264. 
147 Davidson, "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth," p. 265. 
148 Davidson, "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth," p. 264. 
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2.5 Seeing Through Having A Language 
The triangle, Rorty argues, requires all three sides to constitute itself; we cannot 
determine the contribution of one side separately from another. This is evident in 
interpretation where you remain holistic and engage in a circling "play back and forth 
between causation and inference in a way which does not permit any of the corners of a 
triangle to be independent of any others." 149 Triangulation, Rorty states, teaches us that 
I, the other language-users, and the rest of the universe all are what we are because 
the other two sides of the triangle are what they are, and there is no point in trying to 
break down 'are what they are' into more specific processes of projecting or 
reflecting. This is because there is no way of examining any of these three sides in 
isolation from each other, in order to see who is doing what to whom. 150 
Rorty insists that this interdependence should stop us from asking what our relationship 
to the rest of the universe is, to stop thinking that the world is important or matters in 
terms of meaningful speech. We have to stop asking realist questions like 'Whose 
contours, language's or the world's? Whose contours are reflecting whose?r1 51 
If realism tries to figure out what in the world makes a true sentence true or 
worries about discerning the contributions of one aspect of the triangle in distinction from 
another, then it is a metaphysical dead end. Davidson's model of triangulation is not 
intended as a position from which we could discriminate the contributions of one side 
from the other- a position equivalent to the metaphysical realist's God's-Eye point of 
v1ew. 
149 Rorty, "Response to Donald Davidson," p. 78. 
150 Rorty, "Response to Farrell," p. 194. 
151 Frank Farrell, "Rorty and Anti-Realism," in Rorty & Pragmatism, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp, 
Jr. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), p. 192. 
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We can see through language to the world because, Davidson states, language is 
more than a learned skill; it is "or has become, a mode ofperception." 152 Davidson likens 
language to an organ of the body; yet it is more than an organ for "it is essential to the 
other senses if they are to yield propositional knowledge." 153 Philosophers tend to think 
of speech and organs as vastly different sorts of devices - what, after all, does seeing an 
apple or digesting an apple have to do with talking about apples? We consider each of 
these acts as distinct types yet "[s]peech, like the sense organs, has a specialized location 
in the brain; as a result, brain damage can cause a loss of the ability to use language." 154 
Language has the unique specification of being the organ of propositional perception; 
while other senses do not require thoughts or propositional content, if the sensor is to 
perceive how things are- the nature of reality- he needs to speak a language. Without 
epistemological intermediaries, "[p]erception, once we have propositional thought, is 
direct and unmediated ... nothing ... underpins our knowledge of the world." 155 We should 
not think that we see "the world through language any more than we see the world 
through our eyes. We don't look through our eyes but with them." 156 Language is part of 
our "natural equipment [for seeing what is], and not a tool we contrived for coping." 157 
Language puts us in touch with the world and makes the nature of the world present; 
" [ w ]hat appears in the overall character of our linguistic system and our system of beliefs 
is, at least very roughly, the self-display ofthe world." 158 
152 Davidson, "Seeing Through Language," p. 22. 
153 Davidson, "Seeing Through Language," p. 22. 
154 Davidson, "Seeing Through Language," p. 19. 
155 Davidson, "Seeing Through Language," p. 22. 
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agrees 
Language, for the most part, reflects realist ontology; Davidson states that he 
with Rorty that 'we are equally in touch with reality when we describe a hunk of 
space-time in atomic, molecular, cellular, physiological, behavioral, intentional, 
political, or religious terms.' Hunks of space-time are real enough, so what ever 
we say about them, we are 'in touch with reality' even if we describe some hunks 
as witches, griffons or gods. But saying this does not eliminate differences ... The 
differences do not, I hope I have made clear, touch on ontology .... 159 
Ontology is reflected within satisfaction's assignment of entities to expressions; 
satisfaction pairs singular terms with objects. While satisfaction explains how true 
sentences are language specific, Davidson's larger semantic project requires a common 
ontology of objects and events between all language users. Davidson states that "we 
cannot explain how language works without invoking an ontology and assigning objects 
to singular terms. There cannot in my opinion be a language that does not deal with 
particular entities." 160 The nature ofthose particular entities that "we, as interpreters, must 
take them to be is what they in fact are." 161 Davidson's philosophy of language has 
"erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing the way around the 
world generally." 162 
159 Donald Davidson, "Reply to Richard Rorty," in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Lewis Edwin 
Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), p. 599. 
160 Donald Davidson, "Reply to Stephen Neale," in The Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Lewis Edwin 
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2. 6 Modest Realism 
Davidson states that his position is a semantic "non-relativized, non-internal form 
ofrealism" 163 and we have seen above how his realism reconnects us with the world. It is 
also distinct from 
metaphysical realism. It is not internal realism because internal realism makes 
truth relative to a scheme, and this is an idea I do not think is intelligible .... [M]y 
realism is certainly not. .. metaphysical realism, for it is characterized by being 
'radically non-epistemic', which implies that all our best researched and 
established thoughts and theories may be false. 164 
The metaphysical realist's notion of a radically nonepistemic world independent of belief 
is rejected as an idea without content. The semantic character of truth is achieved through 
its intimate connections with meaning and belief while abjuring the possibility of 
determining the reference of individual terms independently of a particular language. 
Because a sentence can only be given a truth value within L the truth of such sentences 
defaults to dependence upon the logic of recursive satisfaction. Satisfaction delivers 
evidence of a theory of truth for L; it tells us what it is for a sentence to be true inLand 
fixes the application of the truth predicate "in a holistically confirmed empirical theory of 
meaning." 165 But, it is only in the empirical context of interpretation that the semantic 
relations between meaning, belief and truth are fully developed. It is only in the empirical 
context that we can have evidence for a theory of truth. Interpretation cannot be achieved 
without charity. Charity yields massive truth. 
Belief is veridical but our knowledge is not absolute nor our language perfect; we 
163 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 122. 
164 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 122. Davidson cannot be a naive realist 
either; the world has to be pretty much as we say it is because veridical belief is a requirement for 
successful communication. 
165 Genova, "The Very Idea of Massive Truth," p. 171. 
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cannot, alas, draw the picturesque and pleasant conclusion that all true belief 
constitutes knowledge. For though all of a believer's beliefs are to some extent 
justified to him, some may not be justified enough, or in the right way, to 
constitute knowledge. 166 
We have to accept a reasonable amount of error in our beliefs and do our best in working 
to refine our studies, our techniques and our methods; we 
know many things, and will learn more; what we will never know for certain is 
which of the things we believe is true .... the 'pursuit of truth' is an empty 
enterprise unless it means only that it is often worthwhile to increase our 
confidence in our beliefs, by collecting further evidence and checking our 
calculations. 167 
We have to accept that we are never going to get outside our beliefs to the metaphysical 
truth of the matter- we just have to get along the best way we can and find out about the 
world through our limited and fallible means; "[t]he best we can do is test, experiment, 
compare and keep an open mind. But no matter how long and well we and coming 
generations keep at it, we and they will be left with fallible beliefs." 168 
2. 7 Conclusion 
Rorty's position seeks to eliminate truth from philosophical dialogue. Davidson 
moves in the other direction and makes truth fundamental to the analysis of language and 
communication. Unlike a correspondence theory of truth that posits a gap between what 
is said and what is, that is, between our opinions and what those opinions are about, 
Davidson provides a naturalist picture of language that breaks down the linguistic-
nonlinguistic dichotomy. What we say is largely caused by and is true of what is 
happening in our environment. This is a return to the world and a vindication of a realist 
166 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 134. 
167 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 67. 
168 Davidson, "Truth Rehabilitated," p. 67. 
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ontology. In giving up representation "we do not give up the world, but re-establish 
unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions 
true or false." 169 Epistemically beliefs are supported by nothing other than other true 
beliefs but nonetheless are true of the world; " [ w ]hat saves truth from being 'radically 
non-epistemic' is not that truth is epistemic but that belief, through its ties with meaning, 
is intrinsically veridical." 170 Davidson's position reveals itself to be a viable but modest 
realism, one based in semantics. 
We have seen that Davidson has been able to do what Rorty said impossible: he 
reestablished the objectivity of truth in a manner that supports realism. In light of 
Davidson's modest realism we must conclude that Rorty is in error in arguing that 
antirepresentationalism necessitates antirealism. 
169 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 198. 
170 Davidson, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," p. 136. 
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Chapter 3 
Politics, Pain and Irony: Difficulties within Antirealism 
3.1 Introduction 
Having shown that Rorty is incorrect to argue that truth is obsolete and objective 
reality a metaphysical illusion, I want to draw out some further implications of 
Davidson's philosophy oflanguage by presenting two further criticisms ofRorty's 
position. Given all of these difficulties, I conclude that Rorty's antirealism is not a viable 
alternative to realism. 
3.2 Liberal Politics, Pain and 'We' 
Rorty opts for the ethnocentric account because, in his view, language has lost its 
central purpose and has fractured into specific communities of vocabularies reflecting 
specific values, histories and cultures. Cut off from the representational project, the 
voices of the western democracies seem only to announce their presence and trumpet 
their form of life. Rorty's liberal community is run by a 'we' - a 'we' based within an 
ethnocentric language reflecting an 'American' way of life (including education, wealth, 
etc.). 
In the liberal community that Rorty envisions, members would have an ironic 
point of view. They would be cured of their metaphysical desire for transcendence and 
would deny that any vocabulary could 'get things right'. Ironists would embrace the 
multiplicity of their views and the contingency of the political theatre in which such 
views can be freely presented while, nonetheless, continuing to believing that such views 
are worth having. The privileged and lucky citizens of this society would aspire to be 
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ironists but rarely would the uneducated achieve such a perspective - thus, the latter 
would just accept their society's vocabulary as final, contingent and commonsensical and 
they would speak it without asking for theological or philosophical underpinnings. The 
best candidates for community leaders in this liberal society, Rorty argues, are the 
'ironists', are us- his readers, his 'we'- "the people who are always willing to hear the 
other side, to think out the implications, etc." 1 -us at our best. Who is Rorty's 'we'2: 
liberal democrats, liberal intellectuals, and educated westerners. 
The public rhetoric of such a society, Rorty argues, cannot be ironic - "I cannot 
imagine a culture which socialized its youth in such a way as to make them continually 
dubious of their own process of socialization. "3 The youth and the uneducated's sense of 
objectivity is just another way for other members of a liberal society to feel solidarity 
with one another. Devoid of any unifying metaphysical goal, the politic ofRorty's 
citizens is unified in difference; it is a solidarity that is essentially negative: "human 
solidarity is not a matter of sharing a common truth or common goal [or common project] 
but sharing a common selfish hope, the hopes that one's world ... one's final vocabulary ... 
will not be destroyed."4 What will bind us together in a liberal community is a mutual 
respect for privacy, a sharing of what is not shared- it is a social organization whose 
public rhetoric is aimed at giving everyone a chance at self-creation. 
1 Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," p. 452. 
2 Rebecca Comay, "Interrupting the Conversation: Notes on Rorty," in Antifoundationalism and Practical 
Reasoning, ed. Evan Simpson (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1987), p. 84. 
3 Richard Rorty, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope," in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 86. 
4 Rorty, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope," p. 92. 
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Unification has as its base the recognition that we can all feel pain. Language and 
"socialization ... go all the way down,'' 5 but underneath, Rorty argues, we share a 
universal animal trait in our ability to feel pain or feel "raw feels. "6 Distinct from the 
beasts we can feel a special sort of pain, socialized human beings can feel humiliation. 
Humiliation, Rorty argues, is the result of one's language (one's belief system) being 
redescribed and, therefore, destroyed. Ironists are particularly apt at humiliation, 
humiliation comes when people are denied the ability to define themselves; 
Ironism, as I have defined it, results from awareness of the power of redescription. 
But most people do not want to be redescribed. They want to be taken on their 
own terms - taken seriously just as they are and just as they talk. The ironist tells 
them that the language they speak is up for grabs ... There is something 
potentially very cruel about that claim. For the best way to cause people long 
lasting pain is to humiliate them by making the things that seemed most important 
to them look futile, obsolete ... The redescribing ironist, by threatening one's final 
vocabulary ... suggests that one's self and one's world are powerless. 
Redescription often humiliates. 7 
Denied ofthe self-creative capacity of language one's 'world has been unmade'.8 
Humiliation as the unmaking of someone's world is a notion Rorty adopts from the work 
of Elaine Scarry. 9 Scarry's argument is that cruelty essentially involves the making 
absent of the voice of the other speaker first by silencing and then by replacement; the 
torturer 
dominates the prisoner in both physical and verbal acts, ultimate domination 
requires that the prisoner's ground become increasingly physical and the torturer's 
increasingly verbal, that the prisoner become a colossal body with no voice and 
the torturer a colossal voice (a voice composed of two voices) ... 10 
5 Richard Rorty, "The Last Intellectual in Europe: Orwell on Cruelty," in Contingency, Irony, and 
Solidarity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 185. 
6 Richard Rorty, "The Invention of the Mind," in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 24. 
7 Rorty, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope," p. 90. 
8 Rorty, "The Last Intellectual in Europe: Orwell on Cruelty," p. 178. 
9 Elaine Scarry, "The Structure of Torture: The Conversion of Real Pain into the Fiction of Power," in The 
Body in Pain (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 27-59. 
10 Scarry, "The Structure of Torture: The Conversion of Real Pain into the Fiction of Power," p. 57. 
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Privately the ironist can describe anyone and anything in any terms he so wishes, but 
publicly the private ironist must strive to act liberally. That is, the public liberal must try 
to be aware of the many ways in which people can be humiliated and act in such a way as 
to diminish suffering. From the liberal ironist's perspective, our "common susceptibility 
to humiliation is the only social bond that is needed." 11 
In Rorty's liberal utopia, public interaction would strive to attain "an appropriate 
mixture of unforced agreement with tolerant disagreement (where what counts as 
appropriate is determined, within that sphere, by trial and error)." 12 In such a society the 
citizens can feel confident that 'objectivity' or 'truth' will be the outcome of open and free 
debate - the sort of debate that 
goes on when the press, the judiciary, the elections, and the universities are free, 
social mobility is frequent and rapid, literacy is universal, higher education is 
common, and peace and wealth have made possible the leisure necessary to listen 
to lots of different people and think about what they say. 13 
It is not deeds, nor force, nor logic but words, persuasion and rhetoric that will determine 
the 'truths' in a liberal society. In light of this, the goal of achieving 'objective truth' is 
nothing more than an appeal to our future generations to achieve "as much intersubjective 
agreement as possible, the desire to extend the reference of [the better] us [that is, 'We') 
as far as we can." 14 Viewed in this negative manner 'truth' becomes "an ever-retreating 
goal, one which fades for ever and ever ... It is not what commonsense would call a 
goal. .. it is not even something to which we might get closer, much less something we 
11 Rorty, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope," p. 91. 
12 Richard Rorty, "Science as Solidarity," in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Philosophical Papers: 
Volume I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 41. 
13 Rorty, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope," p. 84. 
14 Richard Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity?" in Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, Philosophical Papers: 
Volume I (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 23. 
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might realize we had finally reached." 15 If we give up the desire for objectivity we can 
tum our focus from getting 'outside language' to 'amongst us' - we can drop epistemology 
in favor of politics. 16 
In my view, Rorty's 'we', that is, his concept of community, is exceedingly 
narrow. As large as his 'we' is expanded it continues to represent nothing more than the 
aspirations ofprivileged bourgeois western liberals. Returning to Davidson's theory of 
interpretation, I will show that people share more in common than the ability to feel pain 
and humiliation. Our sense of 'we' has to be much broader than the expanding sphere of 
liberal influence Rorty hopes North American democracies can achieve. 
According to Davidson's theory of interpretation, if our interlocutor exhibits 
unexpected linguistic behavior we may change a prior theory to a passing theory so as to 
preserve a theory of belief and foster communication. Davidson uses the following 
example: "you see a ketch sailing by and your companion says, 'Look at that handsome 
yawl."' 17 In this situation you can consider your friend mistaken in his belief- a yawl is 
not a ketch, maybe the friend does not know enough about watercraft so as to make the 
distinction. Alternatively, you may realize that the friend "does not use the word 'yawl' 
quite as you do, and has made no mistake at all about the position of the jigger on the 
passing yacht." 18 If we interpret the latter along 'passing' lines we have dropped the 
distinction between "what a speaker, on a given occasion, means, and what his words 
15 Rorty, "Is Truth a Goal oflnquiry? Davidson versus Wright," p. 298. 
16 This a ideological defense of western liberal democracy; for Rorty's critical assessment see: Richard 
Rorty, "Post-Democracy," in London Review of Books, vol. 26, no. 7, April 2004, pp. 10- 11. 
17 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of an Conceptual Scheme," p. 196. 
18 Davidson, "On the Very Idea of an Conceptual Scheme," p. 196. 
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mean." 19 Thus, the distinction between idiosyncratic and conventional meaning, and the 
authority of the latter, has been dropped. 
Passing theories demonstrate that when communicating we interpret the literal 
meaning of words, that is, meaning is truth functional and truth is a three-place predicate 
(it is tied to a speaker and a time). An utterance has the truth conditions the speaker 
intends it to have and a theory of truth for the foreign speaker's language L proceeds by 
"describing the critical core of the speaker's potential and actual linguistic behavior, in 
effect, how the interpreter intends his utterances to be understood. "20 The speaker always 
uses literal meaning when trying to communicate; "if the speaker is understood he has 
been interpreted as he intended to be interpreted."21 If we can understand what a person is 
saying even if they are using the words atypically we still understand their first meaning -
what they intend to convey to us. Beyond what the speaker is trying to convey to us his 
words have no real meaning - convention has no authority over meaning. Davidson 
argues that philosophers who make convention the basis of language "have the matter 
backwards. The truth is rather that language is a condition for having conventions. "22 The 
erosion of convention, Davidson argues, calls into question our traditional understanding 
of what it is to speak a language and the very concept language itself. 
If the interpreter develops a successful passing theory then he can be said to be 
speaking the same language as his interlocutor - even though he may be communicating 
without the benefit of what is considered an ordinary common language. As 
19 Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," p. 434. 
20 Davidson, "The Structure and Content of Truth," p. 312. 
21 Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," p. 436. 
22 Donald Davidson, "Communication and Convention" in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 280. 
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communication can commence in this manner we cannot maintain the Wittgensteinian 
idea of a language as a 
clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then apply to 
cases .... [no] learnable common core of consistent behavior, [there is] no shared 
grammar or rules, no portable interpreting machine set to grind out the meaning of 
an arbitrary utterance. 23 
That is, we cannot understand language to be something determined solely by convention 
- isolate and unique to different communities of speakers. What we call 'knowing a 
language' boils down to one's ability to construct passing theories; and, the rules by which 
they are constructed amount to little more than 'wit, luck and wisdom and there is no 
hope of regularizing or teaching this process'.24 With 'passing theories' we no longer 
have any use for the traditional concept of language: 
We could hold that any theory on which a speaker and an interpreter converge is a 
language; but then there would be a new language for every unexpected tum in 
the conversation, and languages could not be learned and no one would want to 
master most of them. 25 
Taking Davidson's position seriously means that we have to accept that "there is no such 
thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and 
linguists have supposed. "26 
Davidson's destruction of the traditional notion oflanguage carries great 
implications for the notion of a speech community. Since any two speakers that can 
manage communication can be said to share a language they can also be said to share 
membership in the same speech community. Like languages the number of communities 
are so numerous and so fading the membership seems trivial. These insights into 
23 Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," p. 442-445. 
24 Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," p. 446. 
25 Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," p. 445. 
26 Davidson, "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," p. 446. 
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convention and community suggest that Rorty's 'we' is a exceedingly narrow group drawn 
along artificial boundaries. This becomes even clearer when we consider that Davidson 
has shown that language users share more than an ability to feel pain; in review: language 
gets us in touch with the world, our beliefs are reflected in a language that has to be 
largely objectively true and truth is a requirement of communication. And, because we 
have seen that truth is something we have in common with all language users, it is 
impossible to conclude that convention determines the boundaries of a language or a 
community of speakers - it appears, then, that no one's most basic linguistic practices are 
very far apart or really very different at all. Given our shared physiology and linguistic 
capabilities what previously seemed ethnocentrically bound has been opened to all 
speakers. Culture and history separate our linguistic communities but these are about as 
deep as the differences go, only here does the political arena commence. Rorty's position 
is found wanting in its failure to recognize that we really are a global community of 
speakers united through truth. 
3.3 Commonsense and Irony 
In addition to the above criticism, I argue that at the heart of Rorty's antirealism 
lies a deep contradiction between commonsense and irony. Farrell has sketched this 
tension in his paper "Rorty and Antirealism" and, below, I develop the criticism, giving it 
body and weight. 
We have seen that Rorty gives us two options for 'world' - either we choose the 
realist's radically nonepistemic world (along with its Kantian problems) or we accept the 
world 'out there' in antirealist terms. Opting for the latter means that we accept 'world' as 
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a deliverance of commonsense; he urges us to be commonsensically realist and accept 
that "most things ... have the features they do in entire causal independence from the way 
they are described. "27 The problem is that Rorty has ironically denounced commonsense 
and leaves us with no way to characterize this commonsense world realistically; as 
Farrell puts it: "we should not ... suppose that he is committing himself onto logically to 
such a world. "28 This contradiction is a fatal flaw in Rorty's position. 
Rorty's world can be no more than the play of beliefs, sentences and language; the 
realist "thinks that, deep down beneath all the texts, there is something which is not just 
one more text ... the pragmatist does not think there is anything like that."29 If we are to 
make more of it, as his appeal to commonsense suggests, then grave difficulty lies in the 
fact that commonsense is part of a 'final vocabulary'. A final vocabulary is one that 
supposedly "accurately represents something, a transparent medium ... 'the one which 
puts all doubts to rest' or 'the one which satisfies our criteria for ultimacy, or adequacy, or 
optimality."' 30 Yet commonsense, Rorty argues, 
is the watchword of those who unselfconsciously describe everything important in 
terms of the final vocabulary to which they and those around them are habituated. 
To be commonsensical is to take for granted that statements formulated in that 
final vocabulary suffice to describe and judge the beliefs, actions and lives of 
those who employ alternative final vocabularies.31 
Commonsense solidifies a speaker's way of life and reinforces his community's way of 
speaking to the point that it becomes a final vocabulary - a reflection of the rhetoric of 
realism, a vocabulary that 'suffices to describe reality, get at its intrinsic nature or strikes 
27 Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity," p. 23 
28 Farrell, "Rorty and Antirealism," p. 161. 
29 Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism and Philosophy," in After Philosophy: End or Transformation, ed. Kenneth 
Baynes et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), p. 54. 
30 Rorty, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope," p. 75. 
31 Rorty, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope," p. 74. 
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a real essence'. 32 Rorty hopes that if you are well educated, well read and sufficiently free 
of ignorance then your commonsense should be overcome by a healthy sense of irony. 
The ironist understands that the 
searches for a final vocabulary are not destined to converge ... [S]entences like 
'All men by nature desire to know' or 'Truth is independent of the human mind' 
are simply platitudes used to inculcate the local final vocabulary, the common 
sense of the West. ... Ironists [are ironic] just insofar as their own final vocabulary 
does not contain such notions.33 
Instead of utilizing commonsense Rorty's pragmatic antirealism aims to challenge it; the 
ironist may partake in commonsense public rhetoric but such an indulgence is temporary. 
The ironists have had the illusions of the subject-object picture tom from their eyes and, 
in light ofRorty's antirealist conclusion, would view commonsense with contempt; 
pragmatists 
should see themselves as working at the interface between the common sense of 
their community ... and the startlingly counter-intuitive self-image sketched by ... 
[antirealism]. They should see themselves as involved in a long-term attempt to 
change the rhetoric, the common sense, and the self-image of their community?4 
One must conclude that Rorty's appeal to commonsense is flawed; he views 
commonsense realism as devoid of content, it is the very thing that his antirealism seeks 
to overcome. Rorty's appeal to pain (as the unifying force behind his liberal democracy, 
which also serves as the grounds for the just expansion of 'We') is problematic in this 
light. The notion of all humans sharing the common ability to feel pain and humiliation 
seems straightforward enough, yet such an appeal mirrors Rorty's problematic appeal to 
the commonsense world - it forces us into a situation where we require something beyond 
language- a place where Rorty has forbidden us to go. There is nowhere from within his 
32 Rorty, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope," p. 74. 
33 Rorty, "Private Irony and Liberal Hope," p. 77. 
34 Rorty, "Is Truth a Goal of Enquiry? Davidson versus Wright," p. 300. 
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position to make such claims. Placing the world 'out there' invites representational 
problems but to deny it as Rorty's antirealism does, Farrell suggests, invites linguistic 
idealism; 
The resistance of the world to thought is simply what thought or our 
conversational habits count as resistance; there is no further causal independence 
that is forcing us to accommodate ourselves to its working ... [T]here is little, 
then, to make us resist the temptation to think ofhim as suggesting not a thinking 
mind but a speaking voice (in his case a communal one) that produces all 
determinations out of itself. 35 
Rorty cannot combine commonsense with his antirealist elements - if forced the 
tension between the two destabilizes Rorty's antirealism. His philosophy has a fatal 
contradiction at its core. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The realist versus antirealist debate is one of the most important in contemporary 
philosophy because the stakes are so high. Despite the magnitude of these stakes, we 
have been given good reason to agree that metaphysical realism engenders philosophy 
with representational machinery that is more trouble than it is worth. Philosophers are 
better off abandoning talk of facts, metaphysical noncausal correspondence, and the idea 
of a God's-Eye point of view. The epistemological model of knowledge as a mirror 
between what is revealed to the subject, via the medium of consciousness or language, 
and what is actually out there in the world has led philosophers in circles; Davidson and 
Rorty are right to criticize this tradition. Indeed, Rorty is right to suggest that the threats 
of the Kantian noumena, global error and skepticism seem poised to once again befall any 
35 Farrell, "Rorty and Antirealism," p. 162. 
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philosopher who ventures back towards objectivity- but he is wrong to conclude that 
realism is impossible. 
On the positive side, Rorty's arguments help us examine many realist 
assumptions, clarify issues revolving around representation and dispel many dogmas 
associated with the pursuit of objective truth. Unfortunately Rorty's philosophy swings 
past being a heuristic tool into a narrow conventionalism, extreme ethnocentrism and 
contradiction (possibly even towards linguistic idealism). In this final chapter we have 
seen how antirealism is unbalanced and inherently flawed. Rorty cuts language off just 
where it needs to get started, that is, as the intersubjective standard between all 
communicating agents that share this common world. Because Rorty will not allow our 
community of speakers to share this common ground with other language users we are 
artificially separated from them; understanding language means that the net of linguistic 
inclusion has to be cast much wider than Rorty will allow. And, if we were to take 
Rorty's leap into antirealism we should have to satisfactorily explain how he could appeal 
to the nonlinguistic via commonsense while claiming that language refers to nothing 
outside of itself- a paradox that seems unsolvable. Rorty's position is wrought with so 
many difficulties it can be rejected on its own merit alone. 
Rejecting antirealism required, in my view, more than a negative platform; prior 
to these criticisms I have argued that we do not have to accept antirealism because we can 
maintain realism while avoiding its traditional pitfalls. This thesis has shown that we can 
get back to that solid ground though Davidson's naturalized causal-linguistic model. I 
believe that the realist position is sound and that Davidson has successfully adjusted it to 
a contemporary setting. Davidson has gotten us beyond the subject-object debate because 
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his antirepresentationalism has dropped the idea of correspondence (one-to-one or 
holistic) while respecting the ubiquity of language - language is not a medium we 
manipulate in order to form images of another radically separate world. Yet Davidson has 
given us good reason to continue to argue for the reality of objects existing and having 
features that exist independently of our descriptions. His new realism requires that we 
recognize the semantic relationship between meaning, belief and truth; in doing so we 
must also acknowledge the centrality of the concept of truth for language and thought. 
Language, Davidson has shown, gives us generally true beliefs and does tell us about the 
world. In abandoning representation, we have dropped the idea of truth as a mirror image 
between language and reality; epistemology in Davidson's mirror of meaning demands 
that we be modest about the quality of our knowledge and the methods we use in getting 
to know the world. 
Davidson's reestablishment of realism has enormous implications for knowledge 
and philosophy. It means that we can continue to know and deal with that real world 
without desiring transcendence. Knowledge can be more than linguistic banter; we can 
avoid that sense of free floating and groundlessness that Rorty's antirealism requests. It 
means that philosophy can provide an understanding of truth and recognize its centrality 
without trying to escape the finitude in which human beings find themselves. Davidson 
has brought us to a place where we can philosophize about truth 'without stepping outside 
our skins' - we can see the world through having a language. Philosophy can be more 
than Rorty's alternative of "'seeing how things hang together'- which ... means seeing how 
all the various vocabularies ... hang together."36 Rather than a final parting of ways, 
36 Rorty, "Pragmatism and Philosophy," p. 55. 
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Davidson has shown that a modest realist philosophy (in his case a linguistic one) can 
serve as the backdrop to practicing science with a new attitude - a science stripped of 
correspondence and left to its own devices. Without showing us a way off the 'linguistic 
merry-go-round', Rorty's name for the ubiquity of language, we have been shown the way 
back to hard ground - what we are spinning language from in the first place. 
Given the considerations of this thesis, I conclude that realism can survive the 
downfall of representation, move beyond antirealism and get us back to the world. 
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